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Is War Ever Justifiable? A
Comparative Survey*
RODA MUSHKAT**
Legal scholars and philosophers alike have long been preoccu-
pied with the question of whether war is ever justifiable. This ques-
tion is also of considerable practical importance since the attitudes
towards it influence the proclivity of actors in the international arena
to resort to force in pursuit of their objectives. However, despite its
academic and practical relevance, the question of whether war is ever
justifiable has not been examined in a comprehensive fashion in recent
years. The aim of the present article is to partially rectify this defi-
ciency by offering a survey of the main approaches, both historical
and contemporary (with an emphasis on the latter), that have been
adopted by those who have justified recourse to force in international
relations or challenged its legitimacy.
I. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF THE HISTORICAL MATERIAL
Historically, the question of whether war is ever justifiable has
spawned a multitude of views. This diversity of opinion notwith-
standing, three basic attitudes can be discerned with regard to justifia-
bility of waging war, namely, the maximalist, minimalist and
compromise positions. The maximalists subscribe to the view that
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war is always justified, morally or legally, on both sides, which is
equivalent to saying that a resort to force requires no justification.
The minimalists, on the other hand, contend that war is never justi-
fied, on either side, or that it can have no justification. The compro-
mise position falls between the previous two in holding that war is
sometimes justified, on one side or the other and conceivably, though
improbably, on both sides. In other words, it presupposes that war at
the same time requires and can have justification.
Because of the influence of religious factors, particularly those
rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the minimalist position pre-
ceded the development of its maximalist counterpart. Initial expres-
sions of the former can be traced to the "early church era"' although
it was evident in one form or another throughout the history of social
thought. Minimalist views, while never enjoying widespread support,
gained occasional currency, such as in the sixteenth century with the
emergence of Evangelical Anabaptism2 and in the eighteenth century
amongst political philosophers.
3
The minimalist position was almost invariably qualified. Early
church "pacifists" made no claim for integral acceptance of nonvi-
olence by those who had not chosen the calling of Christianity.
4
1. The "early church era" is broadly defined as the period from the death of Jesus in 29
A.D. until the year 313, when Emperor Constantine the Great declared his conversion to the
Christian faith. For a portrayal of the "early church" era as pacifistic, see Kunz, Bellum
Justum and Bellum Legale, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 528, 530 (1951).
2. The largest movement of pacifists in that period rejected all participation in warfare
on scriptural and theological grounds and viewed just war doctrines as part of the corruption
of the world. See R. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A HIs-
TORICAL SURVEY AND CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION 153-57 (1960).
3. Prominent minimalists of the period included Rousseau (who produced a treatise on
Perpetual Peace in 1756), Montesquieu, Voltaire, Bentham and Kant. Kant, for example, be-
lieved that "humanity was bound to move towards peace because the sense of moral principle
is always advancing in man and rendering more culpable those who violate it." Kant regarded
war as the greatest evil besetting human societies and in one passage he went so far as to
describe war as the source of all evils and of all moral corruption. I. KANT, KANT'S POLIT-
ICAL WRITINGS 183 (H. Reiss ed. 1970). For a historical analysis of the antiwar feelings in
that period as grounded in ideas of "balance and restraint" and the sense of "human responsi-
bility," see J. NEF, WESTERN CIVILIZATION SINCE THE RENAISSANCE: PEACE, WAR, INDUS-
TRY AND THE ARTS 332 (1963); J. NEF, WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESS 209 (1950). In the
latter book, the author also highlights the influence of pacific economic doctrines which found
receptive audiences in that period of growing commercial unity between nations. Id. at 266.
4. See S. BAILEY, PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR 2 (1972) for references and
citations from church fathers. Origen, for example, in Contra Celsum (written in 248 A.D. in
answer to an earlier critique of Christianity by the pagan philosopher, Celsus, Origen's work is
referred to in P. BROCK, PACIFISM IN EUROPE TO 1914 at 11 (1972)) clearly allowed for a
conditional justification of war on a sub-Christian level. Early church pacifism was also af-
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Others, like the chiliastic Taborite priests, while preaching peace in
1418-1419, "called for a sword to extirpate the godless when it ap-
peared that this would not happen without the intervention of human
hands. ' 5 The Mennoists in the sixteenth century would not bear
arms, but accepted a variety of alternatives in lieu of serving with
weapons even though these were in some way connected with the
waging of war.6 They thus confined their rejection of war to the indi-
vidual practice of conscientious objection rather than opting for a to-
tal denunciation of war. During the American Civil War, other
pacifists distinguished between international war and varieties of civil
war, regarding the latter not as war stricto sensu but as police action.
7
Furthermore, until the coming of modern Biblical criticism, Christian
pacifists, including the Quakers,8 considered all wars which had oc-
cured before Christ to be approved by God as had the wars recounted
in the Old Testament. They considered Christ's replacement of the
law of revenge by a new and more loving dispensation to be the ad-
vent of pacifism.
Pacifist doctrines never became a potent intellectual force, and
their societal influence remained limited. Even during periods in
which there was relatively greater receptivity to their ideas, exponents
of minimalist principles remained a distinct minority and had to con-
tend with rival schools of thought. This was certainly the case in the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries which saw the rise of prominent
maximalists such as Ayala,9 Machiavelli,' 0 Bynkershoek I I and Vat-
fected by the military needs of specific geographical areas. As Bainton remarked, "Pacifism
best flourished within the interior of Pax Romana (especially in the Hellenistic East) and was
less prevalent in the frontier districts menaced by barbarians." R. BAINTON, supra note 2, at
69.
5. P. BROCK, supra note 4, at 473.
6. Id. at 477.
7. See generally P. BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE COLONIAL
ERA TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1968).
8. See P. BROCK, supra note 4, at 472.
9. See, e.g., Ayala's statement that "the right to make war is a prerogative of princes
who have no superiors." B. AYALA, DE JURE ET OFFICIIS BELLICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI
LIBRI III, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (J. Bate trans. 1912).
10. Machiavelli was an articulate representative of the political philosophy of his period
(sixteenth century) when war was conceived as an indispensable tool of statecraft. "When it is
a question of the safety of the country no account should be taken of what is just or unjust,
merciful or cruel, laudable or shameful, but without regard to anything else, that course is to
be unswervingly pursued which will save the life and maintain the liberty of the [fatherland]."
N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (1537), quoted in R. BAINTON, supra note 2, at 125.
11. Bynkershoek perceived war as a mere condition, "a contest of independent persons
carried on by force or fraud for the sake of asserting their rights." C. BYNKERSHOEK, QUAES-
1987]
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tel 12 as well as the development of just war thinking represented by
Suarez, 13 Gentili,14 Grotius15 and others.
At the same time, genuine adherence to the view that resort to
war is always acceptable was equally rare. This applies even to peri-
ods such as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the interna-
tional legal system formally endorsed an unqualified right to resort to
war based on the sovereign position of states. 16 In fact, statesmen did
TIONUM JURIS PUBLIcI LIBRI Duo, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (T. Frank
trans. 1930).
12. According to Vattel, the legality of war under the "voluntary Law of Nations" did
not depend on the justice of the cause but rather on the "presence of the elements constituting
a regular war." E. VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA Lol NATURELLE:
APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS, in CLAS-
SICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916). The nineteenth century writers
Phillimore and Wheaton expressed the respective views that war was the "exercise of the inter-
national right of action to which, from the nature of the thing and the absence of any common
superior tribunal, nations are compelled to have recourse to in order to assert and vindicate
their rights," R. PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (3d ed.
1879), and that "[e]very state has.., the right to resort to force, as the only means for redress
for injuries inflicted upon it by others." H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
309 (1936). The nineteenth century also saw the development of a "military doctrine" accord-
ing to which war was a positive, generating power, a process of national growth, in fact an
indispensable factor in the assertion of the inherent right of nations to development. See
Moltke, A Letter to Professor Blutntschli, Acknowledging Receipt of the Manual of the Law of
War, 13 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 80 (1881).
13. This Jesuit theologian (who theorized about law), while conceding the existence of
some evil traits in war, stressed the greater evils that would result without war. Moreover,
Suarez believed that an act of "vindictive justice" was indispensable to mankind given the
deficiency of other peacekeeping methods. See F. SUAREZ, DE TRIPLICI VIRTUTE THEO-
LOGICA, FIDE, SPE, ET CHARITATE, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTIONS
FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J. 821 (G. Williams, A. Brown & J. Waldron
trans. 1944).
14. As stated by Gentili, "[W]ars are just even though so many things which come from
them are evil, because their final aim is good, after the rebels have been forced to submit to
reason." A. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28
(J. Rolfe trans. 1933).
15. In fact, Grotius' analysis of "whether war is ever justifiable" was a systematic attempt
to refute the pacifist tradition within Christianity. Thus he asserted that Christ's teachings
could not support a pacifistic stand in that "if it had been the purpose of Christ [to absolutely
do away with capital punishment], beyond doubt with the most direct and explicit words he
would have laid down the rules that no one should pass a sentence of death, and that no one
should bear arms." H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, in CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925). Similarly, Grotius pointed out, a review of
past "practice" of the majority of Christians would serve to uphold the contention that Chris-
tians seemed to have no greater scruples about waging war than adherents of any other faith.
Id. at 20. War was perceived by Grotius as a judicial and punitive procedure for the redress of
wrongs suffered and for the vindication of rights. Id. at 171.
16. Note, for example, Vattel's proviso that "[w]hen a sovereign, or a Nation, is deliber-
ating upon the steps he must take to fulfill his duty, he must never lose sight of the necessary
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not rely on sovereignty to exempt them from the necessity to justify
engagement in war. Rather they regularly claimed justification for
their recourse to war, even though the law stipulated that this was
unnecessary, and thus indirectly acknowledged the need for
justification. 17
By distinguishing between law and practice, proponents of the
maximalist position may have wished to overcome the institutional
deficiencies inherent in just war doctrines while at the same time
wishing to retain a measure of restraint upon the waging of war.
Given the lack of consensus on the meaning of justice, the unavailabil-
ity of a judge who could be relied upon to evaluate the position of
competing states with strict impartiality, and no probability that the
proud rulers of sovereign states would defer to such a judge if one
were available, it was not surprising that at the theoretical level just
war doctrines gave way to a maximalist position. As Vattel put it,
"Since... Nations are equal and independent and can not set them-
selves up as judges over one another, it follows that in all cases open
to doubt the war carried on by both parties must be regarded as
equally lawful" (and, by extension, equally subject to the restraining
force of the laws of war).Is
The early modem statesmen of the European system appeared
also to believe that they had to choose betweenjus ad bellum andjus
in bello or between restricting the right to go to war and limiting the
manner of fighting.' 9 As suggested by Howard, states have never
readily accepted the paradoxical demand "[t]o submit to restraints
law, which is always binding in conscience," E.VATrEL, supra note 12, at 305 (emphasis in
original), since, after all, "[w]hoever knows what war really is, whoever will reflect upon its
terrible effects and disastrous consequences, will readily agree that it should not be undertaken
without the most urgent reasons for doing so. Humanity revolts against a sovereign who,
without necessity or without pressing reasons, wastes the blood of his most faithful subjects
and exposes his people to the calamities of war, when he could have kept them in the enjoy-
ment of an honorable and salutary peace." Id. at 243. Similarly, Lorimer asserted that war
was a means and never an end in itself, one argument being that "we cannot lawfully fight for
fighting's sake because fighting, in this sense, is a wasteful expenditure of force and law is an
ideal economics." J. LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 19 (1884).
17. According to Parry, "no state has even resorted to war without fervent protestation
of the justice of its cause as surely would not have been the case had the right of war ever been
absolute." Parry, The Function of Law in the International Community, in MANUAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 27-28 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968). In practice, war was always accompanied
by an appeal to legal or moral rights which had in some ways been injured. See Farer, Law
and War, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 26 (C. Black & R. Falk
eds. 1971).
18. E. VATrEL, supra note 12, at 247.
19. See W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (7th ed. 1917).
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which prejudiced ones [sic] chances of victory when fighting a right-
eous cause, to accept the concept of jus in bello when one had an
unquestionable jus ad bellum ."20 They opted, therefore, for regula-
tion and humanization of interstate violence rather than prohibition.
Thus viewed, the maximalist position did not develop out of fas-
cination with the institution of war nor out of moral commitment to
it, but was prompted by the belief that regulation is the most viable
instrument for moderating the effects of war. It can be said, therefore,
that the maximalists have expressed preference for an extreme posture
on the grounds of its compatibility with the realities of international
politics of the day.
While absolute versions of minimalist and maximalist positions
have rarely been evidenced by historical material, a compromise stand
on the justifiability of war is more easily established. To reiterate,
such a stand, which is generally designated as the just war doctrine,
corresponds to the view that engagement in war may be justifiable,
and must be justified.
This doctrine, although present in Ancient Greek2' and Roman
thought,22 is essentially a product of Christian theology and of the
changing circumstances of the church under the Roman Empire. 23
Its emergence in a more defined manner can clearly be traced to the
acceptance, in the fourth century, of Christianity as the established
religion of the Empire which brought to an end the profession of paci-
fist sentiments in the church. The question of whether a Christian
could participate in a war without committing sin was initially an-
swered by St. Augustine24 who then took his place at the head of a
20. RESTRAINTS ON WAR 5 (M. Howard ed. 1979).
21. While renouncing war as a desirable state policy, ancient Greek thinkers were pre-
pared to accept its necessity under certain circumstances. War could be justified but only if
peace was its objective: "We make war so that we can live in peace." 10 ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 10 (1909).
22. The Romans also conceived war as an integral part of the natural order of mankind
but recourse to arms had to be justified nonetheless. Indeed, the question of sufficiency or
insufficiency of motives for war had occupied the works of several Roman historians. See von
Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L.
665, 666 (1939). Cicero's writings, for example, reflected the Plato-Aristotle formula of "war
for the sake of peace" when expounding that "[tihe only excuse for going to war is that we may
live in peace unarmed." CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 37-39 (W. Miller trans. 1921).
23. The alliance of Church and Empire was marked by Constantine's acceptance of
Christianity.
24. St. Augustine asserted that Christians were not compelled by the Gospel precepts to
abstain from the use of force or from killing if they were acting in a public capacity. See C.
CADOUX, THE EARLY CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TO WAR 49-66 (1919). Wars were regarded by
St. Augustine as: inevitable (as long as men and their societies were "moved by avarice, greed
[Vol. 9:227
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long line of theologians, natural law philosophers, and international
lawyers including: Aquinas, Victoria, Luther, Grotius and Pufendorf.
All these thinkers shared the recognition of the need for, and the fea-
sibility of, the justification of war and set forth criteria according to
which the justness of resort to war should be determined.
25
Comprising notions of the permissibility of war - one ought to
resist, to overthrow or to punish perpetrators of injustice; to seek re-
venge or even reparation for injury; and to promote and establish jus-
tice - dominated medieval thinking on war. The just war doctrine
obviously flourished when the Catholic Church had a generally ac-
ceptable claim to preside over its application. As observed by Mc-
Dougal and Feliciano, the Western world at that time "exhibited a
basic unity characterized, in its fundamental aspect, by one widely
and deeply shared body of spiritual perspectives, a centralized ecclesi-
astical organization that transcended political boundaries, and a com-
mon overriding respect for the supreme ecclesiastical authority, the
Papacy."' 26 Such conception of the Papacy's authority as a source in-
dependent of and higher than human volition enhanced just war theo-
ries which assumed the existence of a body competent to pass
judgment on the justness of a belligerent's cause.
The doctrine had, however, languished following the profound
changes in the conditions of the medieval world which seriously af-
fected the viability of bellum justum. In particular, the Reformation,
with its disintegrating impact on the unity and authority of the
church as well as the consolidation of the effective power of territorial
polities, meant that there was no longer a supernational organ com-
monly acknowledged as competent to pass judgment on the legiti-
macy of the cause asserted by a sovereign prince who resorted to
violence.
and lust for power, the permanent drives of sinful men"), ST. AUGUSTINE, DE CIVITATE DEI
13 (M. Dods trans. 1948), necessary (in order to prevent worse evils such as anarchy and open
flouting of the rules of human society), see H. DEANE, THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEAS OF
ST. AUGUSTINE 161 (1963), justifiable, under certain circumstances, and even holy and sanc-
tioned by god in some cases (when fought against heretics and schismatics). Id. at 194-202.
25. See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIKA (trans. 1919); F. VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE
IVRE BELLI RELICTIONES, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 166-67 (J. Bate trans.
1917); M. LUTHER, WHETHER SOLDIERS, Too, CAN BE SAVED (1526), cited in S. BAILEY,
PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR 17 (1972); H. GROTIUS, supra note 15, at 171; S.
PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CIVIS JUXTA LEGEM NATURALEM LIBRI DUO, in
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (F. Moore trans. 1927).
26. McDougal & Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggres-
sion and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J. 1057, 1066 (1959).
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As indicated above, this decentralized and unorganized character
of the world arena was reflected in modified maximalist notions of
justification of war during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In
the absence of central authority and the prevalence of strong national-
istic movements, sovereign claims to the right to wage war gained
prominence and were accorded legitimacy.
The just war doctrine (or a compromise position) came to the
fore again in a somewhat altered version in the aftermath of, and the
reaction to, World War 1.27 The establishment of the League of Na-
tions provided the international structure and procedure necessary to
give effect to a revived and revised just war idea. With the League as
church, the Secretary General as Pope and the doctrine of collective
security as the theological creed of the twentieth century, multi-state
system, secular replacements had been provided for the ecclesiastical
accoutrements of the medieval just war doctrine.
Support for the reinstatement of the just war notion in positive
international law can also be found in other important international
documents including the Kellogg-Briand Act 28 and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal. 29 Eminent theorists such as Kelsen,
Oppenheim and Tucker have firmly placed these instruments in the
traditions of the just war doctrine30 although other writers, notably
Kunz, argue that the old bellum justum theory can in no way be con-
sidered a part of modern positive international law. Invoking a dis-
tinction between bellum legale and bellum justum, Kunz has
contended that there was no basis for the opinion that the discrimina-
tion between wars made by the Pact of Paris (and for that matter by
the Covenant and the U.N. Charter) ought to be viewed as entailing a
distinction in classical terms between just and unjust wars since the
illegality of resort to war in these treaties was not a function of the
27. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
1 (M. Hudson ed. 1931) (Part 1 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919).
The Covenant seemed to establish that resort to war was forbidden under certain, but not all,
circumstances. In most serious disputes, war was placed in the position of last resort after
peaceful means had failed.
28. Treaty for the Renunciation of War, reprinted in 4 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
2522 (M. Hudson ed. 1931) (the Treaty for the Renunciation of War is also known as the
"Pact of Paris"). While renouncing wars of aggression, the Treaty clearly permitted wars in
self-defense and as an instrument of collective action to restrain an aggressor. The Treaty also
did not abolish resort to war between signatories of the Pact and non-signatories, nor did it
prohibit resort to war against a country which had violated its provisions.
29. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (1945).
30. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 333 (1945); see also Tucker,
The Interpretation of War Under Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 23 (1951).
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intrinsic injustice of the cause of war but a breach of a formal, proce-
dural requirement. 3' It appears, however, that Kunz has taken a
somewhat narrow view in concerning himself with the specific content
of the peacekeeping provisions of the above instruments rather than
considering the broad concept of the attempt to limit war.
At the same time, modem conceptions of just war, while basi-
cally propounding the same principle of justification of war, differ
from traditional theories both in terms of target and scope. With re-
spect to target, it is arguable that earlier just war concepts, which had
been influenced by the church, were concerned less with the ruler
than with his individual subjects, who had the need for advice as to
how to reconcile their religious obligations with their civic commit-
ments. The twentieth century formulation, by contrast, aims at deter-
ring states from embarking upon unjust military retaliation. As to
scope, it can be said that twentieth century revisionists are more re-
strictive with respect to the substance of just causes for war while
their predecessors recognized many more justifications for resort to
force.
32
The neo-just war doctrine that emerged following the First
World War went on to assume a more defined framework with the
promulgation of the U.N. Charter in 1945. The Charter appears to
have firmly established the principle that fighting can be justified but
only in resistance to unjustified fighting. While sharply curtailing the
traditional list of injuries that should be regarded as permitting the
just warrior to go into action, the new version of just war nonetheless
specifically identifies the injustice of recourse to nondefensive war,
that is, to war for rather than war against.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL POSITION
The path which the Charter of the U.N. has attempted to follow
has been laden with ambiguities caused and exacerbated by the lack of
definition of fundamental terms. For example, while the Charter re-
flects the traditional desire to outlaw war when it speaks of saving
"succeeding generations from the scourge of war," it also condones
wars of self-defense, those "in the common interest," and wars which
are "necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
31. Kunz, supra note 1, at 532.
32. A fuller discussion of this point of difference is found in the author's doctoral thesis.
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ity.' ' 33 Again the world community, succumbing to the natural incli-
nation to choose sides, appears to have rejected the polar maximalist
and minimalist perspectives in favor of the compromise position that
recourse to war is sometimes justified, thus requiring an effort to sort
out the just and unjust causes.
A. The Prohibition on the Use of Force: Article 2(4)
of the United Nations Charter
Specifically, the Charter proscribes the use of force which in-
cludes both the comprehensive and highly intensive uses commonly
associated with war and the less comprehensive and relatively milder
actions often described as "measures short of war,"' 34 against "the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of any state." 35 Such a pro-
hibition was further supplemented by the "Niirnberg Principles" of
1945 - which authorized the imposition of sanctions on individual
persons judicially considered to be responsible for the "planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances" 36 - and
subsequently reiterated in charters of regional governmental
organizations. 37
Indeed, the rule of the Charter proscribing the use of force in
international relations has been interpreted and restated with some
consistency over the years since 1945. Most notably, the General As-
sembly in 1970, in its Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, "solemnly pro-
claimed" that "[s]tates shall refrain in their international relations
33. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 explictly recognizes a Member State's inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48.
34. See Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURs 455, 489 (1952).
35. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Article 2(4) states in its entirety that "[a]ll Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations." Id.
36. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1950] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 376, U.N. Doc. A/I 316 (Principle VI of international law recognized in the
Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal); see also Draft Code of
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind Adopted by the International Law Com-
mission, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
37. See generally citations to treaties collected in McDougal & Feliciano, International
Coercion and World Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J.
771, 802 n.100 (1958); McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 26, at 1060 n.12.
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from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations."38 The Assembly reasserted
this principle in Resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the Non-Use of Force
in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of
Nuclear Weapons when it "solemnly declar[ed] on behalf of the State
Members of the Organization the renunciation of the use or threat of
force in all its forms and manifestations in international relations, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. ' 39 On that occa-
sion the General Assembly also recalled prior Resolution 2160 (XXI)
which reaffirmed the principle that armed attack by one state against
another or the use of force in any other form contrary to the Charter
of the U.N. constituted a violation of international law giving rise to
international responsibility.4° Such use of force was later defined as
aggression in the 1974 Definition of Aggression adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly 41 and its prohibition was further restated in the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.42 A
more recent confirmation of the principle of non-use of force in inter-
national relations found expression in General Assembly Resolution
32/150 of December 19, 1977, which set up a Special Committee with
a view to drafting a world treaty on non-use of force in international
relations.
43
B. The "Exceptions" to the General Prohibition on Force
In none of the above international instruments, however, is a to-
tal ban on the use of force advocated. A sphere of permissible coer-
cion is invariably preserved, and with it the need to provide
justifications and distinguish between just and unjust wars. Indeed,
according to the creative team of McDougal and Feliciano, "[t]he
world community's prescriptions about coercion, like other world
prescriptions, march and must march in pairs of complementary op-
posites. An absolute interdiction of all coercion is scarcely conceiva-
ble, or if conceivable, is hardly within the limits of the achievable."
44
38. 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
39. 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
40. 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
41. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9890 (1974).
42. Signed on August 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 (1975).
43. See Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle
of Non-Use of Force In International Relations, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 41), U.N. Doc.
A/34/41 (1979).
44. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 26, at 1062.
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Consequently, several forms of justifiable recourse to war are identi-
fied and discussed below.
1. Low-level coercion
There is a "relatively low-level coercion which is 'normal' and
perhaps ineradicable in the ordinary value processes taking place
across state boundaries and which includes all coercion not acceler-
ated to the levels of intensity and magnitude that signal impermissible
coercion. ' '45 This category presumably embraces the inherent right of
states to use force internationally in ways which do not violate article
2(4), that is, in circumstances which do not threaten or impair the
territorial integrity or political independence of another state.
2. Use of force in self-defense and with article 51 of the United
Nations Charter
There is the "coercion of relatively great scope[46] and intensity
... that is exercised in necessary response to and defense against im-
permissible coercion by others. '4 7 This inherent right to resort to
force in response to unauthorized coercion is explicitly recognized in
article 51 of the U.N. Charter and pertains both to force exercised by
the target state individually or by a collectivity of states. In fact, as
pointed out by Kelsen,48 not even the most highly centralized and
effectively organized municipal systems attempt to prohibit private
coercion absolutely; some provisions for self-defense in residual, ex-
ceptional cases always remain. A fortiori in the existing decentralized
world arena in which the general community of states still lacks effec-
tive capacity to protect itself, it would seem impractical to aim at
elimination of permissible self-defense thereby achieving a truly com-
plete prohibition of force.
3. Defense measures which do not comply with requirements
under article 51
It appears reasonable to support the view that advocates an inter-
45. Id. at 1123-24. This exception may possibly be read into the definition of force in
article 2(4) which prohibits the use of force "against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations" and could be construed as implying large-scale force. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
46. The scope of permissible action in self-defense is examined in the author's doctoral
thesis.
47. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 26, at 1121-22.
48. See H. KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1957).
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mediate status of permissible coercion between self-defense on the one
hand and aggression on the other and refuses to automatically classify
as aggression all situations falling short of the limits of self-defense as
perceived under article 51.49 Arguably, adoption of a different inter-
pretation would result in the absurd placement of cases that fail to
conform strictly to the specific words of article 51 in the same cate-
gory as hard core aggression. Thus, for instance, it would not accord
with our sense of justice to equate the behavior of a state which em-
ployed force with the explicit objective of expansion and acquisition of
territory with that of a state which protected itself without any ag-
gressive intention but did not uphold the standard of proportionality
as required under article 51. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume
that there are such cases outside the purview of article 51 - such as
where the attack is aimed at aircrafts or ships which are not territory;
where the aggression relates to instances of defense by United Nations
Emergency Forces which are not a state; where a state believed in
good faith that an armed attack occurred though objectively no such
attack took place; or where the defending state failed to immediately
report to the Security Council as required under the article50 - which
may nonetheless constitute actions in self-defense and can thus be
viewed as additional forms of permissible coercion.51
4. Force employed consistently with the purposes of the United
Nations and not directed against "territorial integrity
or political independence"
Another approach which attempts to extend the legal justifica-
tion for recourse to force beyond the narrowly defined action of self-
defense under article 51 centers on the qualification to which the
prohibitions of article 2(4) are subject. Such an approach has found
expression in the work of Stone who has argued, with some convic-
tion, that what article 2(4) prohibits is not use of force as such, but its
use against the "territorial integrity or political independence of any
state" or "in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations. ' 52 These purposes may properly extend beyond arti-
cle 1, which delineates the purposes of the United Nations to include,
inter alia, the prevention of the scourges of war and maintenance of
49. See Z. Tamir, Extra-Legal Self-Defense in International Law (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970).
50. Id. (a detailed discussion of similar cases).
51. J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 43 (1958).
52. Id.
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fundamental human rights, conditions assuring justice, respect for the
obligations arising from treaties, and general international law.
53
Furthermore, the purposes expressed in article 1 embrace not
only collective measures against threats to peace, breaches of the
peace and acts of aggression, but also the adjustment or settlement of
disputes in accord with fundamental principles of international law
and justice. 54 It is possible to argue that a threat or use of force em-
ployed consistently with these purposes, and not directed against the
"territorial integrity or political independence of any state," may be
commendable rather than necessarily forbidden by the Charter. It is
also conceivable that situations may arise in which attempts to settle
disputes by peaceful means can be so delayed, and prospects of suc-
cess so remote, that a minimal regard for law and justice in interstate
relations might require the use of force in due time to vindicate these
standards, and avoid even more catastrophic resort to force at a later
date. It is Stone's conclusion that "there is, at any rate, no clear legal
warrant for reading the Charter and the travau prepartoires, as is
sometimes done, as if Article 2(4) excluded all resort to force except
in self defense or under the authority of the United Nations, thus ex-
cluding these other possibilities.
'55
A similar construction of article 2(4) was adopted by the United
Kingdom Representative to the U.N., Sir Eric Beckett, in the Corfu
Channel Case.56 In defending the British mine-sweeping operation in
Albanian territorial waters, Sir Beckett stated: "Our action . . .
threatened neither the territorial integrity nor the political indepen-
dence of Albania. Albania suffered thereby neither territorial loss nor
any part of its political independence. ' ' 5 An equivalent position was
taken by the United Kingdom in the debates of the Sixth Committee
with respect to the Principles of International Law Concerning




56. 2 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (merits); 1 Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. 15 (preliminary objections).
57. 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings 295-96. Sir Pierson Dixon's statement in the First Emergency
Session of the General Assembly concerning the 1956 Suez intervention is illuminating: "Our
action is in no way aimed at the sovereignty of Egypt, and still less at its territorial integrity. It
is not of our choice that the police action which we have been obliged to take is occurring on
Egyptian territory." 10 U.N. GAOR (561st plen. mtg.) para. 102, U.N. Doc. A/PV.561
(1956).
58. 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (805th mtg.) para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.805 (1963).
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tion that the Charter proscribed the threat or use of force in interstate
relations only when directed at the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of another state was also reiterated by other state repre-
sentatives. 59 In fact, the reaction of the international community to
certain incidents of state practice suggests perhaps that forceful meas-
ures which do not threaten a state's independence enjoy high levels of
tolerance and may indicate a shared belief that force used in the inter-
ests of justice and international law is legally justifiable.
6
0
5. Collective defense for reasons other than external aggression
Employing the same line of reasoning as adopted above in rela-
tion to individual self-defense, it is forcefully contended that a nar-
rowly defined category of collective self-defense is insufficient to
accommodate all cases of such a nature, particularly where a state
asserts both vital interests and a moral right to assist a people in a
civil war but is unable to point out any external indirect aggression or
intervention sufficient to justify collective self-defense.61 Most charac-
teristic in this respect is the contention made by a few national repre-
sentatives in United Nations debates on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Between States
that the rendering of armed assistance to colonial peoples engaged in
59. See, e.g., Canada, 25 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression (56th mtg.) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.56 (1970); Italy, 25 U.N. GAOR
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (69th mtg.) at 38, U.N. Doc. A/
AC. 134/SR.69 (1970); Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggres-
sion, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) para. 86, U.N. Doc. A/8019 (1970).
60. Note, for example, the Congo operation (1961), India's intervention in Bangladesh
(1971) and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda (1979). Lillich has noted that "neither the
Stanleyville rescue operation nor any other claimed humanitarian intervention has been con-
demned by the United Nations as violation of Article 2(4), in marked contrast to its repeated
condemnation of claims to use forcible self help by way of reprisals." Lillich, Humanitarian
Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 244 (J. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter Lillich, A
Reply to Ian Brownlie]; see also Conference of the Procedural Aspects of International Law
Institute, Charlottesville Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, reprinted in Hu-
MANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 3, 64, 107-08, 114 (R. Lillich ed.
1973). With regard to the Indian intervention, see the observation that "[d]espite the violation
of Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter by India, it was not even blamed or censured by the
UN, which in fact seemed reconciled to India's recourse to military force against Pakistan."
Islam, The Use of Force in International Relations: The Indian Invasion of East Pakistan, 2
LAWASIA 171, 192 (1983). The United Nations' inaction in the case of Tanzania is noted in 25
KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 29670 (June 22, 1979). This point will be further
examined in the context of "humanitarian intervention" discussed in the text accompanying
notes 87-102 supra.
61. See W. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 337 (1981).
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a struggle for independence was a laudable activity excepted from the
proscriptions of article 2(4) as a particular modality of collective self-
defense permissible under the Charter.
62
6. Regional action
Another factor which has a bearing on the use of force in collec-
tive self-defense is the emergence of regional spheres of dominance
and the frequent exercise by regional organizations of the right to re-
sort to military means in order to protect regional interests. Ostensi-
bly, the Charter provisions for regional actions allow regional
organizations extensive powers in derogation of article 2(4) and even
greater powers are assumed by them in practice. Regional organiza-
tions have come to interpret articles 52 and 53 as giving primacy to
the bloc in settling disputes among its own members. 63 Indeed, both
the United States and the Soviet Union have asserted the right to es-
tablish regions of superpower dominance to which article 2(4) of the
Charter does not apply. 64 Within these proclaimed spheres, the col-
lective organization is in fact plaintiff, judge and executioner.
65
Although it may not be normatively justified, 66 such a trend has
been explicated in terms of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations
as well as the change in the distribution of international power from
62. See Turkey, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (892d mtg.) para. 31, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.892
(1965); Syria, 22 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1094th mtg.) para. 28, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1094 (1968);
Kenya, id. at para. 33; Kuwait, id. at para. 38.
63. Article 52 legitimizes the "existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing
with... matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security." U.N. CHAR-
TER art. 52, para. 1. Moreover, article 52 encourages these bloc agencies to "make every effort
to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or ... agen-
cies before referring them to the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 2.
Article 53 authorizes, inter alia, enforcement action by regional arrangement or agencies
against former enemy states of any signatory from the Second World War. U.N. CHARTER
art. 53, paras. 1 & 2.
64. The "Johnson Doctrine" expresses the American view of the rule of force in bloc
situations, namely, that a bloc leader has the right to use force on behalf of the bloc in in-
trabloc situations. See N.Y. Times, May 29, 1965, at 2, col. 2 (speech by President Johnson).
Similarly the "Brezhnev Doctrine" introduced the concept of limited sovereignty of nations
within a bloc and asserted the right of a bloc leader to intervene even to the point of using force
where the situation threatened to remove the target nation from the orbit of the bloc. See
Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries, Pravda, Sept. 25, 1968, reprinted in
7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1323 (1968).
65. For an interesting discussion of the derogation of the validity of article 2(4) in in-
trabloc situations, see Franck, Who Killed Art. 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of
Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 822 (1970).
66. See Bravender-Coyle, The Brezhnev Doctrine in International Law, 3 LAWASIA 114-
125 (1984).
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the balance of power system, which prevailed until the beginning of
World War I, to the loose bipolar international system that developed
after World War II. It is suggested that the conditions which re-
quired limited objectives under the balance of power system no longer
prevail and the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of
other nations is largely inoperative. Rather, "[i]nterdependence
within the bloc gives positive motivation for intervention, and concen-
tration of capabilities within the two leading bloc powers appears to
make their role as intervenors inevitable.
'67
Furthermore, according to Schwarzenberger, a bloc law of inter-
vention is justified as a system-serving element of peacekeeping opera-
tions.68 In his view, as long as the nuclear stalemate lasts, each side
by keeping its own bloc house in order "makes its own indispensable
contribution to the maintenance of world peace." 69
7. Enforcement measures by the United Nations
More explicit grounds for permissive coercion are provided in
the U.N. Charter in relation to the exercise of force in the form of
police action within the framework of the collective security system
created by the United Nations, that is, the implementation of enforce-
ment measures duly undertaken by the Organization. Accordingly,
under chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council 70 is empow-
ered to order or authorize military action in respect of a threat to the
peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Coercive action is
also available pursuant to a decision of a regional organization for the
maintenance of peace and security in a particular region, subject to
the conditions laid down in chapter VIII of the Charter.
Thus, in providing for the possibility of enforcement action
needed to maintain or restore international peace and security, the
U.N. Charter itself implies that the use of force is not an unmitigated
evil. Rather, the Charter seems to be consistent with the history of
mankind's approach to warfare: the evil is deplored, but circum-
stances are foreseen in which the evil of warfare is apparently judged
to be a lesser evil.
67. Oglesby, The Use of Force in Bloc Situations, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77, 87
(1972).
68. Schwarzenberger, Hegemonial Intervention, 13 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 236 (1959).
69. Id. at 261.
70. But note that the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution provided
that in case the Security Council failed to fulfill its primary responsibility, the execution of this
responsibility was to be reserved to itself.
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8. Action against former enemy states
Another recognized exception to the principle of non-use of force
in international relations pertains to action against former enemy
states. This exception is embodied in article 107 of the Charter which
stipulates that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall invalidate or
preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second
World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Char-
ter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments
having responsibility for such action. '71 It is reasonable, of course, to
argue that this provision only intended to cover the immediate post-
war period and is now obsolete. This view gains some weight from
the fact that article 107 was included under a chapter entitled "transi-
tional security arrangements." Such an interpretation, however, is
less valid with respect to article 53 which reinforces the above provi-
sion in the context of regional organizations.
72
C. Intervention
A contemporary analysis of the justifiability of the use of force in
international law must also take cognizance of what may be regarded
as the modern version of war, namely intervention. Conceived
vaguely by Vattel, 73 the concept of intervention matured into perma-
nent usage by the time de Martens wrote the third edition of Precis du
Droit des Gens moderne de l'Europe in 182774 and thereafter appears
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 107.
72. According to article 53:
[N]o enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of
measures against any enemy state ...provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in
regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of
any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on the request of the Gov-
ernments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggres-
sion by such a state.
U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
Note, however, reactions of the United States, Great Britain and France to the Soviet claim in
1968 of its right to intervene in the affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on the
ground that the latter was posing a threat to international peace by the revival of Nazism. The
United States denied such a right, asserting that the Charter provisions in question had, due to
changed circumstances in Europe in which the two halves of Germany were each allied to
opposing military blocs, become obsolete. The Times(London), Sept. 18, 1968, at 1, col. 4.
For similar reasons the Soviet attitude was also strongly opposed by Great Britain and France.
Id., Sept. 21, 1968, at 5, col. 7.
73. See E. VAITrEL, supra note 12, at 19.
74. See Winfield, The History of Intervention in International Law, 3 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
130, 135 (1922-23) (discussing the history of the word "intervention").
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to have provided a convenient mechanism for the use of force in the
world arena. While armed intervention is not necessarily equivalent
to regular war (although war often results and is always risked), the
two generally share the element of compulsion and may be appraised,
therefore, within a similar framework.
In fact, a just/unjust war analysis can no longer be limited to
regular war but must extend into the broad category in which physi-
cal force is exercised. 75 This is particularly the case in view of the
great proliferation of types of warfare and the continued blurring of
the distinctions between insurrections, civil wars, just struggles
against colonialism, wars of national liberation, guerrilla wars, spar-
row wars, war by proxys, United Nations' wars to preserve the peace,
international socialist wars to serve the cause of revolution, and con-
ventional interstate wars.
1. The principle of nonintervention
The concept of intervention defies definition. "Of all the terms in
general use in international law," states Fenwick, "none is more chal-
lenging than that of intervention. Scarcely any two writers are to be
found that define this term in the same way or who classify the same
situations under it. ' '76 A principle of nonintervention was nonetheless
enunciated by the United Nations General Assembly. Adopted by a
vote of 109 to zero, with one abstention, the General Assembly Decla-
ration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty 77
seemed to reflect current opinion of the international community
when it provided that:
No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever in the internal or external affairs of any State.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interven-
tion or attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements are
condemned. 78
75. It is not intended, however, to include other claims of use of force which do not take
the form of a military presence such as blockades of normal passage, of trade and transit or the
use of mass media to launch a campaign of hatred and vilification, and so forth. See references
to the "development dimension in the concept of non-use of force" in General Assembly, Re-
port of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of
Force in International Relations, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 41), U.N. Doc. A/34/41 (1979).
76. Fenwick, Intervention: Individual and Collective, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 645 (1945).
77. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6220 (1965).
78. Id.
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This principle was later reiterated in the 1970 Declaration of Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and fortified
by the addition of the provision that armed intervention and all forms
of interference are in violation of international law.
79
2. Exceptions to the principle of nonintervention
By the same token, the proscription of nonintervention has suf-
fered erosion over the last three decades through the use of permissive
doctrines justifying intervention under certain circumstances, for in-
stance, by invitation (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Af-
ghanistan 1979), under a treaty (secondary justification of the Soviets
in the above cases) and in internal conflicts. Normatively, however,
they have not been accepted without qualifications.
a. intervention by invitation
Under normal conditions, recognized governments have a right
to receive external military assistance and outside states are free to
furnish such aid. However, an intervention of this type, even by invi-
tation, will contravene article 2(4) of the Charter if the outside force
imposes restrictions on the political independence of the country as a
condition of its aid. Examples of impermissible restrictions attached
to military assistance include the installation of a "puppet" govern-
ment or denial of the peoples' right to determine who will rule them.
Needless to say, the intervening power (U.S.S.R. in the examples
noted above) has failed to convincingly demonstrate that its use of
force has not infringed upon the right of the people of the countries
invaded to determine their political system and the composition of
their government.8
0
b. intervention under a treaty
The same objections are likely to be raised with respect to inter-
ventions based on treaties of the kind sometimes concluded between a
new state and the colonial or mandatory power which had previously
controlled it. Thus, critics of the inviting regime would argue that the
treaty provision for intervention and its specific invocation violated
79. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, reprinted
in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (I. Brownlie 2d ed. 1972).
80. See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1644-45 (1984) (discusses the Grenada intervention of 1983).
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the sovereignty of the nation and frustrated the process of self-deter-
mination and self-government. It should be noted, however, that a
treaty may constitute a sufficient legal basis for coercive intervention
if undertaken within the limits of collective self-defense as generally
understood, namely, in the form of aid to another state in case of
aggression or armed attack.
c. intervention in internal conflict
Also permitted as a form of collective self-defense is a counter-
intervention in the context of civil war following an illegal interven-
tion on one side.81 However, to support with force one side and not
the other in an internal conflict is to deprive the people in some mea-
sure of their right to decide the issue by themselves. It is indepen-
dence of the state engaged in civil war.
82
d. intervention to protect nationals abroad
At the same time, international lawyers interpreting state prac-
tice point to a large number of justifiable interventions inspired by
moral considerations. A fairly broad base of support exists, for in-
stance, to legitimize interventions to protect nationals,8 3 although
opinions differ as to the legal rationale underlying such a justification.
One line of reasoning contends that the territorial integrity or political
independence of a state is not impaired by an emergency action solely
to rescue nationals from a danger which the territorial state cannot or
will not prevent and hence should not be regarded as transgressing
article 2(4) of the Charter.84 A second line of reasoning believes that
the numerous international instruments dealing with human rights,
and the increasing involvement of the United Nations with human
rights, have shifted human rights from the area of exclusive state ju-
81. Id. at 1642.
82. Id. at 1643. The above "exception" will also be discussed from the point of view of
legitimacy of authority in the author's doctoral thesis.
83. It seems that even scholars who deny the legality of such interventions in strict law
are ready to accept it in practice when "cogent reasons of humanity for acting [exist]." See,
e.g., I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 301 (1963)
(footnote omitted).
84. See A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 at 11-18
(1967); Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325,
334-51 (1967) [hereinafter Lillich, Forcible Self-Help]; Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human
Rights, 15 MCGILL L.J. 205, 210-19 (1969); Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect
the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167 app. A, 176-77
(R. Lillich ed. 1973).
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risdiction to that of international concern thereby rendering the non-
intervention principle inapplicable to those cases 8 5 A final school of
thought asserts a right to intervene under such circumstances as a
measure of self-defense in accordance with article 51 of the Charter.86
e. humanitarian intervention
Another legal basis for intervention provides that intervention
for the protection of human rights in general is justified on humanita-
rian grounds within the limits of general international law. 7 This
view, which has many supporters in the international legal commu-
nity, was cogently expressed by Oppenheim. Although he accepts
that "by virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy a State can
treat its own nationals according to discretion, '8 8 Oppenheim pro-
ceeds to assert that:
[T]here is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support
of the view that there are limits to that discretion and that when a
State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its
nationals, in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights
and to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the inter-
est of humanity is legally permissible.8 9
Over a decade later, Jenks wrote:
[T]he world must recognize the need ... for external intervention
85. See McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of In-
ternational Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
86. See Waldock, supra note 34, at 466-67; Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of Inter-
national Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 5,
172-74 (1957); D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-105 (1958);
Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS 347-400 (1961); Fen-
wick, The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-Defense, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 64
(1966) (editorial comment); J. STONE, supra note 51, at 94-97. Thomas and Thomas go on to
extend the permissibility of self-help to protect one's own nationals as part of the "inherent
right of self-defence" through an "ancilliary-like" rationale to cover situations in which the
nationality link is missing. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 84, at 20. A wider use of
article 51 is also made by Rostow who maintains that "[tihe customary international law right
of humanitarian intervention in situations of chaos and massacre survives under the Charter
presumably as a form of limited self-help under Article 51 to remedy catastrophic breaches of
international law." Rostow, Book Review, 82 YALE L.J. 829, 848 (1972).
87. See generally Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 84, at 325; de Schutter, Humani-
tarian Intervention: A United Nations Task, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 21 (1972); H. LAUTER-
PACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 120-21 (1973); Fonteyne, Forcible Self-
Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in HUMANI-
TARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 197 app. B (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
88. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 279 (7th ed. 1948).
89. Id. at 279-80.
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in cases not covered by the right of self-defence as so defined [in
Article 51 of the Charter] in which a world interest or the con-
science of mankind is involved. The world community cannot tol-
erate acts of savagery on the ground that its civilised members have
international relations. 90
It is further argued in this respect that the failure of the international
community to establish an effective collective machinery to enforce
basic United Nations instruments on human rights, which on their
part call for individual and collective action to implement their pur-
poses, has left enforcement measures to states, or groups of states,
acting in their own discretion. 9' It is only logical, the argument goes,
that self-help prerogatives revive when an effective collective mecha-
nism to protect against gross violations of human rights is unavaila-
ble. 92 A system of co-ordinate responsibility for the active protection
of human rights is thus created whereby members may act jointly
with the organization as well as singly or collectively under interna-
tional common law of humane intervention.
93
The views of states on the question of humanitarian intervention
tend to vary. The debates on the Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
suggest the following categorization among States: 1) those rejecting
humanitarian intervention for doctrinal and policy reasons, 94 2) those
asserting that the principle of non-intervention should not apply when
action was taken to remedy situations such as denials of human
rights,95 and 3) those accepting the principle of non-intervention ex-
cept in exceptional cases of gross violations of human rights, that
is, (a) those likely to affect international peace and security,
96
90. C. JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF LAW? 30 (1969).
91. See McDougal & Reisman, Response, 3 INT'L LAW. 438, 440-41 (1969); Franck &
Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J.
INT'L L. 275, 299-302 (1973).
92. Reisman, Nullity and Revision, cited in Lillich, A Reply to Ian Brownlie, supra note
60, at 229, 239.
93. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 91, at 444.
94. Mexico, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States (30th mtg.) at 4-6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.30 (1964); Rumania, 20 U.N.
GAOR C.A (1403d mtg.) para. 23, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/SR.1403 (1965).
95. Algeria, 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (809th mtg.) para. 26, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.809
(1963); Mali, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (882d mtg.) para. 34, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.882 (1965);
Syria, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (884th mtg.) para. 52, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.884 (1965); Senegal,
20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (889th mtg.) para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.889 (1965); Turkey, 20 U.N.
GAOR C.6 (892d mtg.) para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.892 (1965).
96. See, e.g., United Arab Republic, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly
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(b) genocide,97  (c) apartheid and racial discrimination, 98  and
(d) denial of the inherent right to self-determination. 99
The above debates revealed that states are generally reluctant to
accept interventions directed at remedying human rights violations as
an explicit exception to the Charter's prohibition of force; although, a
certain notion of distributive justice, notably prevalent among social-
ist and third world countries, has led them to recognize the justifiabil-
ity of intervention for the protection of human rights in specific
contexts (e.g. colonial and neo-colonial).'°°
At the same time, the lack of formal condemnation or criticism
in principle in the United Nations and in other international forums,
in cases such as the Stanleyville operation and the Indian intervention
in Bangladesh, lends support to the view that the world community
by its lack of adverse reaction in practice condones conduct which,
although a formal breach of positive legal norms, appears acceptable
because of higher motives of a moral, political or other nature. 0 1 In-
deed, according to one theory, this lack of express condemnation in
specific cases would in fact confer on such actions the character of
Relations and Co-operation Among States (30th mtg.) at 20-21, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 119/SR.30
(1964).
97. Bulgaria, 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (807th mtg.) para. 27, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.807
(1963); Mongolia, 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (819th mtg.) para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.819 (1963);
Mali, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (882d mtg.) para. 34, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.882 (1965); Turkey, 20
U.N. GAOR C.6 (892d mtg.) para. 31, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.892 (1965); Pakistan, 20 U.N.
GAOR C.1 (1404th mtg.) para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.1404 (1965).
98. Bulgaria, 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (807th mtg.) para. 27, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.807
(1963); Ghana, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States (29th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.1 19/SR.29 (1964); Central African Repub-
lic, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (884th mtg.) para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.884 (1965); Senegal, 20
U.N. GAOR C.6 (889th mtg.) para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.889 (1965); Turkey, 20 U.N.
GAOR C.6 (892d mtg.) para. 31, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.892 (1965).
99. Hungary, 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (806th mtg.) para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.806
(1963); Ghana, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States (29th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 1 19/SR.29 (1964); Central African Repub-
lic, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (884th mtg.) para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.884 (1965); Senegal, 20
U.N. GAOR C.6 (889th mtg.) para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.889 (1965); Afghanistan, 22
U.N. GAOR C.6 (1000th mtg.) para. 47, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1000 (1967); Liberia, 22 U.N.
GAOR C.6 (1001st mtg.) para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1001 (1967).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 303-49.
101. See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 64 (R. Lillich ed.
1973) (comments by Professor Franck); id. at 73 (comments by Professor Frey-Wouters); id. at
114 (comments by Professor Friedmann); Wright, The Legality of Intervention Under the
United Nations Charter, 51 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 79, 81 (1957) (proceedings of the fifty-first
annual meeting).
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some kind of second-tier or sub-legality. 102
f. intervention for "rectification" purposes
A particulary strong sense of justice is embedded in another ar-
gument justifying forcible intervention, namely the argument of recti-
fication. Based on an analogy to general principles of the domestic
law of restitution and quasi-contract, a state is said to possess a right
of rectification when it is about to suffer irreparable harm as a result
of a second state's failure to perform its acknowledged legal duty.
Given the well established rule in municipal law that allows a person
to perform the duty of another without the permission of the default-
ing party when immediately necessary to satisfy the requirements of
public decency, a state may be considered to be within its lawful
rights when rectifying a wrongful situation by performing the legal
obligation neglected by the delinquent state.'0 3
D. Reprisals10 4
In addition to the reasons offered for the legitimization of self-
help measures which are protective in nature, arguments are also ad-
vanced which contain a pronounced element of retributive justice. It
is pointed out by Bowett, for instance, that Security Council practice
implies recognition of the permissibility of some type of reasonable
reprisals. 0 5 Others draw support for excluding certain reprisals from
an interpretation of article 2(4) of the Charter, which leaves open the
102. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 61-62, 118 (R. Lillich
ed. 1973) (comments by Professor Lillich); id. at 68-69 (comments by Professor Falk).
103. A discussion and application of the principle to the Entebbe incident is noted in
Sheehan, The Entebbe Raid: The Principle of Self-Help in International Law as Justification
for State Use ofArmed Force, 1 FLETCHER FORUM 135 (1977); see also Control of Terrorism in
International Life: Cooperation and Self-Help, 71 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 17, 31 (1977) (proceed-
ings of the seventy-first annual meeting); Rubin, Terrorism and Social Control in International
Law Perspective, 6 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 60, 67-68 (1979). Rubin links "rectification" to the
broad concept of self-defense as it evolved in United Nations practice and considers it a subcat-
egory of the latter to the exclusion of the undefinable and unlimited concept of "national
security."
104. A more in-depth examination of this issue is undertaken in the author's doctoral
thesis.
105. See Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 22
(1972); see also Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The Customary Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
586, 597 (1972). Farer attempts to analyse the "asymmetrical" response of the Security Coun-
cil to the various incidents of reprisals in terms of the particular political context, but he too
identifies justifiable cases of reprisals which may even have a "meliorative effect" on global
interrelationships. See Farer, Law and War, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 21, 66, 69-76 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971).
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possibility that reprisal is a use of force "not inconsistent with the
purposes of the UN. ' 10 6 A case in point is the Corfu Channel Case' 07
in which, according to Waldock, the Court implied that some residual
right to reprisal remained in the modern international legal order. 0 8
Yet others, in an attempt to reconcile the state of the law regarding
reprisals with their common occurrence in the international arena,
resort to sheer rationality in contending that if war, the ultimate
weapon, was accepted as a legitimate form of self-defense it was "in-
comprehensible that the use of a lesser weapon [reprisals], a part
rather than the whole, should be regarded as objectionable."' 10 9
A different line of argument concerning the justifiability of repri-
sals emphasizes their character as a protective measure of self-help
distinct from retribution."10 It is asserted that terrorist attacks on ci-
vilian populations represent a violation of individual and collective
human rights of those individuals subjected to such violence.", Since
the United Nations has been ineffective in granting protection from
terrorist assaults, victim States must themselves retaliate in some way
as a matter of survival, for "no State can be required passively to en-
dure attacks upon its citizens."'" 2 The fact remains that armed repri-
sals are a frequent phenomenon of international politics"13 and, as
observed by Friedlander, will continue to be utilized by an aggrieved
party when the world community is either unwilling or unable to take
effective remedial action.' 14
106. See E. COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (1948).
107. 2 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (merits); I Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. 15 (preliminary objections).
108. Waldock, supra note 34, at 501.
109. Dinstein, The Legal Issues of "Para-War" and Peace in the Middle East, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 466, 472 (1970).
110. Such a distinction was drawn by Britain in defending its attack upon a Yemeni for-
tress during March 1964. See Leiser, The Morality of Reprisals, 85 ETHICS 159 (1975).
111. Dinstein, Terrorism and Wars of Liberation Applied to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: An
Israeli Perspective, 3 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 78, 79-81 (1973).
112. M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 221 (1977).
113. Indeed, all major powers have had recourse to reprisals in recent years; see references
to the United Kingdom in Danaba (1957), France in Sakheit (1958), United States in the Gulf
of Tonkin (1964) and USSR in the Chinese border incidents (1969) by Dinstein, A Survey of
Self-Defense in International Law, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
273, 279 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973).
114. Friedlander, Retaliation as an Anti-Terrorist Weapon: The Israeli Lebanon Incursion
and International Law, 8 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 63, 73 (1978).
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E. General Trends
One thread of reasoning seems to run through all the above argu-
ments which promote - for the sake of humanity and justice - forci-
ble interventions or self-help actions even in the context of a general
condemnation of the use of force in international relations, namely,
that it is preferable to resort to coercion "rather than abandon all
such resort to force to a blanket condemnation" thus leaving much
state conduct unregulated.' 15 The present tendency, amongst jurists
at least, is to confirm customary principles permitting states some
power of forcible initiative, provided this latitude is adequately safe-
guarded by well defined limiting criteria.11 6 In the spirit of the just
war tradition, attempts are constantly being made to distinguish be-
tween justifiable and unjustifiable uses of force and provide a moral
framework within which states could conduct their international
relations.
At the same time, the parameters of permissibility of force are
not carefully delineated, particularly since they hinge to a large extent
on the meaning and scope accorded to terms such as "aggression" and
self-defense.1 17 Although "aggression" has now been defined as con-
sisting of acts involving the opening of a conflict by force of arms,
11 8
the definition is replete with elements subject to varied interpreta-
115. This point was made, for example, by Richard Falk with regard to reprisals. See
Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415, 431
n.39 (1969); see also Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention, I GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45, 45-77 (1981).
116. Several sets of criteria for the appraisal of humanitarian intervention have been sug-
gested by various scholars in recent years. See, e.g., Nanda, The U.S. Action in the 1965 Do-
minican Crisis: Impact on World Order (pt. 1), 43 DENVER L. J. 441, 475 (1966); Farer,
Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 266, 271 (1967); Lillich,
Forcible Self-Help, supra note 84, at 347-51; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help under International
Law, 62 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 129 (1980); Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doc-
trine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the UN. Charter, 4 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 203, 258-68 (1974).
117. It should be recalled, however, that the correlation between self-defense and aggres-
sion is not exhaustive of the range of permissible use of force.
118. See 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/L.46 (1974), reprinted in
13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 710 (1974); G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at
142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), noted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 588 (1975). The en-
acted definition notes that "the first use of force by a State in contravention of the charter" was
to be admitted only as "prima facie evidence of an act of aggression." The Security Council
may, therefore, when making its decision, be guided by "other relevant circumstances." 13
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 713 (1974). And, as indicated, in the tenth paragraph of the pream-
ble to the resolution, "the question whether an act of aggression has been committed must be
considered in light of all the circumstances of each particular case." Id. at 712.
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tions' t9 which, in turn, may affect the permissible limits of forcible
actions. Thus, for instance, a broad conception of aggression which
embraces subversive activities emanating from a neighboring country
would tend to extend the scope of admissible self-defense. Similarly,
acceptance of the thesis that defensive responses are legitimate even in
the case of indirect aggression might open a rather wide field for the
use of force in defensive actions.
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter has also been exposed to very
broad interpretations, the least controversial of which is the one main-
taining that under the Charter any breach of article 2(4) gives rise to a
right of self-defense in accordance with article 51. Coupled, however,
with a rather liberal view of the term "force" in article 2(4) as encom-
passing "all forms of pressure including those of a political and eco-
nomic character which have the effect of threatening the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state,"' 120 the right of self-
defense is substantially enlarged. Another frequent contention is that
forcible measures may be legitimately taken in self-defense whenever
national security is threatened; whether by specific armed attack, or
any other direct or indirect aggression.121 Article 51 is perceived as
119. Indeed, it is Stone's thesis that the consensus definition of aggression contributed
nothing to clarify the important issues raised by the Charter provisions on the use of force by
states. The definition, he argues, either evaded these issues or gave deliberately ambiguous
answers, thereby perpetuating rather than resolving pre-existing conflicts of views. See gener-
ally J. STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS: UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES TO AG-
GRESSION (1977).
120. See Report of the Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States, 21 U.N. GAOR Annex III (Agenda Item 87) at 22, U.N. Doc. A/6230 (1966). For a
detailed analysis of the various interpretations given to the term "force" in article 2(4), see
Jacewicz, The Concept of Force in the U.N. Charter, 9 POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 135 (1977-78).
121. Israel, for example, claims that her entire posture is one of self-defense and that all
forcible actions resorted to are taken on that basis. In 1966, before the Security Council, the
Israeli representative noted that "[w]hatever we do, whatever our government decides to do, it
is done in order to defend and protect our national independence and our national security" 21
U.N. SCOR (1321st mtg.) at 21, S/P.V. 1321 (1966). Again in a Security Council debate in
March 1969 it was stated by the Israeli representative: "Yesterday's Israeli action was an act
of self-defense ... Israel has been in a state of self-defense since 1948. It will so remain until
the Arab Governments agree to end the war waged against Israel and conclude peace." 24
U.N. SCOR (1466th mtg.) at 48, S/P.V. 1466 (1969); 24 U.N. SCOR (1468th mtg.) at 21, S/
P.V. 1468 (1969). India also claims that her incursion into East Pakistan was in self-defense.
Yet it was obvious that no attack against Indian territory was occurring nor was one
threatened. It was India's view that her security was imperilled by the conditions existing in
East Pakistan and particularly by the great influx of Bengali refugees into Indian territory
which was depleting her slender food reserves. See Mrs. Gandhi Said to Set Terms for Visits by
Observer Teams, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1971, at 16, col. 7; Schanberg, India and Pakistan:
Short of War, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1971, at 2, col. 3; No Reaction So Far, N.Y. Times, Nov.
30, 1971, at 3, col. 5. Support from international jurists for the above contention with regard
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covering the use of force to protect the citizens of a nation in a situa-
tion of distress or to remedy severe breakdowns in public order after
earthquakes, riots or other disastrous circumstances such as those
which surrounded the Entebbe raid.122 And finally, in its most con-
troversial form the permission to use force in self-defense has been
taken to mean that when the cause of a state is just, it is entitled to use
force in the exercise of its rights to self-defense. 123 A variety of tech-
niques are employed to avoid the limitations of the armed attack ref-
erence in article 51. Most are based on the premise that paragraph 4
does not itself restrict the right of self-defense, 124 a premise commonly
defended on the grounds that a momentous change in international
law requires explicit language.
This multitude of interpretations and the general ambiguity of
the language in the Charter is said to reflect the draftsmen's recogni-
tion that "as a matter of policy Members should be unlikely either in
1945 or 1974, to leave themselves exposed and helpless in the face of
an indefinite series of grave wrongs by a blanket prohibition of force-
ful reaction."'1 25 Indeed, it seems that international behavior is moti-
vated by the notion that in the absence of a society possessed of
effective collective procedures for protecting the rights of its members
as well as for changing conditions that have become oppressive and
inequitable, any attempt to deny states some ultimate means of self-
redress is bound to fail. The trend which may thus be discerned since
the adoption of the Charter, is one of attempting to preserve a sphere
to self-defense can be found, amongst others, in the writings of J. STONE, supra note 51, at 496-
99; Waldock, supra note 34, at 496-99.
122. See Sheehan, supra note 103, at 135.
123. See Dugard, International Terrorism and the Just War, 12 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 21,
23 (1977). A more detailed examination of self-defense as a "just cause" will be provided in
chapter four.
124. There is a substantial reliance on the fact that the Charter's Drafting Committee 1/I
stated in its report that the "use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and
unimpaired." Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I as adopted by Com-
mittee I/I, Doc. 944, 1/1/34(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 446, 459 (1945). The report was approved
by Commission I. See Verbatim Minutes of fifth meeting of Commission I, Doc. 1187, 1/13, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 202, 204 (1945).
125. According to Stone's incisive analysis of the 1974 Definition of Aggression, the exer-
cise of defining aggression was in fact a "political warfare by other means" while at the same
time states took care to ensure sufficient ambiguities in the text for future freedom of maneu-
ver. As Stone observes, "[i]t is ... as much the unpredictability of future relations, as any
present Machiavellian intentions, which holds States from committing themselves in advance
to simple, precise and qualified criteria of aggression, capable of instant clearcut application in
crisis." J. STONE, supra note 119, at 12-13.
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of justifiable use of force, which tends to expand or contract depend-
ing to a certain extent on its ideological basis.
In particular, the period since 1960 bears evidence of such a
trend, consequently earning the label "era of traditional just war doc-
trine revisited."12 6 This label, it is suggested, conveys the notion that
"the world no longer seriously purports to accept the view that peace
is unconditionally a higher value than justice." Rather, nations "have
returned to the medieval view that it is permissible and perhaps even
desirable - and, conceivably, even mandatory - to fight to promote
justice, broadly conceived. Evil ought to be overturned, and good
ought to be achieved, by force if necessary." 127 Put another way, re-
cent historical development reaffirms that the issue of the justifiability
of engagement in war hinges not on whether one has chosen to fight in
pursuit of some goal, but whether the goal is a just or unjust one.
This attitude towards the use of force is reflected in the emphatic
support given by the United Nations to the demands for a speedy
termination of colonial regimes, 128 an attitude which has culminated
in the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of insurgencies against such
regimes. 129 Indeed, debates preceding the United Nations Declara-
tion of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
did not even consider the option of a total ban of armed force from
international relations. Rather, a major part of the discussions fo-
cused on issues such as whether the legal use of force included a right
of nations or peoples to self-defense against colonial domination130 in
the exercise of their right to self-determination, 131 or what constitute
the limits of legally permissible interventions by states in matters
126. See Claude, Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions, 95 POL. Sci. Q. 83, 94 (1980).
127. Id.
128. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
Special Committee on Its Implementation, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at
66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960), reviewed by 13 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 701 (1968).
129. G.A. Res. 2548, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969);
G.A. Res. 3070, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res.
3031, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 87, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972). In 1973 the General
Assembly reaffirmed in Resolution 3070 (XXVIII) "the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle for
liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available means,
including armed struggle."
130. It has been an Afro-Asian theory that colonialism is a permanent aggression that can
be legitimately repelled at any time on the basis of self-defense, but it should be pointed out
that neither the Declaration nor other resolutions explicity base thejus ad bellum of the libera-
tion movements on self-defense.
131. See G.A. Res. 1966, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 70, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
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within the domestic jurisdiction of another state. 13 2 The discussion
concluded with the provison that "nothing in the foregoing paragraph
shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope of
the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the use of
force is lawful."' 133 Specifically, the Declaration proclaimed people's
right "to seek and receive support" in actions against, and resistance
to, any forcible actions depriving them of their right to self-determina-
tion, freedom, and independence. 34 In a similar vein, later resolu-
tions of the General Assembly confirmed the legitimacy of struggles
for national liberation, to achieve self-determination, and to end racial
oppression. 
3 5
Various theories have been formulated by state representatives in
this context. It is argued, for instance, that wars of self-determination
are permissible as a form of self-defense. This argument generally in-
volves a wide interpretation of article 51 of the Charter and an ex-
panded definition of what constitutes force. 136 Another school of
thought perceives colonialism as a form of permanent or continuing
aggression, thereby warranting a legitimate use of force against it in
the exercise of the right to self-defense. 37 A third theory focuses on
132. See 21 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States (29th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.26 (1966).
133. See source cited at supra note 38.
134. Id.
135. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6220 (1965);
G.A. Res. 2326, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/L.541/Rev.1 and Add.l
(1967); G.A. Res. 2908, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/L.677/Add.l
(1972); G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9446 (1974). It
should be added, however, that these resolutions, while mastering commanding majorities,
have consistently lacked Western support. The exception has been resolutions which condemn
specific and unpopular cases such as Portugal, although even in this case the United States and
United Kingdom have mostly resorted to abstaining rather than voting in favor of the resolu-
tions. See G.A. Res. 2270, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6657 (1967);
G.A. Res. 2395, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 63, U.N. Doc. A/7352 (1968); G.A. Res.
2795, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 98, U.N. Doc. A/8549 (1971); G.A. Res. 2980, 27
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 81, U.N. Doc. A/8959 (1972); G.A. Res. 3061, 28 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/L.702/Add.1-7 (1973).
136. Note the debates in the Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States: Czechoslovakia, 19 U.N. GAOR (4th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 1 19/SR.4
(1964); Rumania, 19 U.N. GAOR (7th mtg.) at 17-18, U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.7 (1964);
Czechoslovakia, 19 U.N. GAOR (8th Mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC. I 19/SR.8 (1964); United
Arab Republic, id. at 8-9; Ghana, 19 U.N. GAOR (10th Mtg.) at 14-15, U.N. Doc. A/
AC. 119/SR. 10 (1964).
137. See supra note 130. This argument was raised by India at the time of its invasion of
Goa, see 16 UN SCOR (987th mtg.) para. 46, U.N. Doc. A/PV.987 (1961), and supported by
Ceylon, Liberia and the UAR, 16 U.N. SCOR (988th mtg.) paras. 128-29, U.N. Doc. A/
PV.988 (1961). A similar argument was also put forward to Madagascar in the debates on the
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the fact that since the right of self-determination is recognized, it
would have as a necessary corollary a remedy in international law.
138
Finally, a fourth line of reasoning grounds the legitimacy of wars of
national liberation in what has been termed the rule of exception.
139
It postulates that article 2(4) and the definition of aggression are inap-
plicable to wars of national liberation and that consequently, in such
cases, the use of force is legitimate. 14
The latter assertion was featured in the debates of the Special
Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-
Use of Force in International Relations. In the view of several
delegates:
[N]othing in the treaty which would finally be drafted should call
in question the legitimacy of the struggle being waged by colonial
peoples to attain independence or restrict the right of peoples still
subjected by colonial and racist regimes to pursue, by all means
available to them, their struggle to free themselves from the yoke of
aggression. 141
Such views were strongly countered in the course of the relevant de-
Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 29 U.N. GAOR
(1474th mtg.) para. 36, U.N. Doc. A/9619/Corr.1 (1974).
138. For the debates in the Sixth Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, see:
Mali, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1207th mtg.) para. 62, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1207 (1970); Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1208th mtg.) para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1208
(1970); Libya, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1208th mtg.) para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1208 (1970);
Tanzania, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1213th mtg.) para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1213 (1970). Such an
argument was also implicit in the drafting group's Report to the Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/9019
(1973).
139. This term was coined by Gorelick, Wars of National Liberation: Jus ad Bellum, 11
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 71, 81 (1979).
140. Article 7 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression was interpreted by some countries as
incorporating such a "rule of exclusion." For the relevant statements of the delegates, see:
Mongolia, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1474th mtg.) para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1474 (1974); Kenya,
id. at para. 24; Madagascar, id. at para. 39; China, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1475th mtg.) para. 13,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1475 (1974); Libya, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1477th mtg.) para. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/1477 (1974); Algeria, 29 U.N. GAOR (1479th mtg.) para. 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1479
(1979); Democratic Yemen, id. at para. 27; Senegal, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1480th mtg.) para.
17, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1480 (1974); Burundi, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1482d mtg.) para. 8, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/1482 (1974); Tunisia, id. at para. 26; Cameroon, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1483d
mtg.) para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1483 (1974); Egypt, id. at para. 32; Sudan, 29 U.N. GAOR
C.6 (1504th mtg.) para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1504 (1974). Conflicting interpretations of arti-
cle 7 were nonetheless given by other representatives and the cogency of the various conten-
tions is discussed in the author's doctoral thesis.
141. 27 U.N. GAOR (2082d plen. mtg.) para. 28, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2082 (1972); Cyprus,
27 U.N. GAOR (2084th plen. mtg.) para. 74, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2084 (1972); Jordan, 27 U.N.
GAOR (2084th plen. mtg.) para. 94, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2084 (1972).
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bates, and further rebuttals have been provided by scholars.14 2 But
whether wars of national liberation and the like may be accepted as a
legitimate use of force or not, the fact remains that the majority of the
United Nations membership has, in fact, already supported the per-
missibility of such wars, and a modification of international legal
norms may have taken place. 143
Strictly speaking, the question whether war is ever justifiable
under contemporary international law could legitimately prompt an
uncompromising answer with a reference to the "scheme" of the U.N.
Charter. Under this scheme, the use of force is prohibited except for
individual and collective self-defense prior to Security Council action,
or when centralized within the framework of chapter VII of the Char-
ter. Such an answer would fail, however, to take cognizance of what
Hart has termed the "internal aspect of rules," namely, the way that
rules are viewed by those states subject to them. 44 While an observer
adopting an external perspective may record the relevant Charter pro-
visions and the numerous international resolutions confirming the ille-
gality of the use of force, to understand the way in which these
proscriptions affect the conduct of states, one needs to acknowledge
the consistent claims and value preferences expressed by states in rela-
tion to the international use of force.
The overall tendency appears to be towards opting for the com-
promise position of the just war doctrine and attempting to set mor-
ally acceptable limits within which war could be waged rather than
embracing the general proposition that all forms of international vio-
lence are equally legitimate or equally illegitimate. This compromise
position of distinguishing use of prohibited force from that which is
both necessary and desirable is preferable to the "[c]omplete disor-
der" which has "characterized the perspectives of traditional interna-
tional law" as a result of the failure to forbid even the most intense
and comprehensive destruction of values.
45
Clearly, it has been amply demonstrated that the deeply en-
142. A detailed discussion of the validity of the various claims is found in the author's
doctoral thesis.
143. While according to orthodox legal thinking, "wars of national liberation" are internal
phenomena, there often is third party involvement in such wars and even in the absence of
direct involvement by international actors, they often have external ramifications. Addition-
ally, in the analysis of war, a distinction between internal and international wars often becomes
blurred and both are examined within the same overall framework. By the same token, stu-
dents of war also tend to arrive at conclusions which may apply internally as well as externally.
144. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55-60, 86-88 (1961).
145. See, e.g., McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 26, at 1063.
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trenched ideological diversity among states is such that it precludes
the possibility of seriously outlawing war altogether and that war, or
at least the realistic threat of war, does, and perhaps must, remain a
viable option in the pursuit of national policy. It is even arguable that
"the sustained peace' [if we may so speak] between the United States
and the Soviet Union," for instance, "is itself premised on the mutual
tolerance of lesser wars [in which either or both may be indirectly
involved]."'' 46 One conclusion may, in any case, be drawn; namely,
that it is imperative to take into consideration and accommodate the
contending ideologies of the various powers of the world.
Indeed, this conclusion finds considerable support in the social
science literature on the phenomenon of war. Bozeman, for example,
argues in a recent article that "[i]n the multicultural environment of
the twentieth century, foreign-policymakers must recognize and ana-
lyze multiple, distinct cultures as well as political systems that differ
from each other significantly in their modes of rational and normative
thought, their value orientations, and their dispositions in foreign
affairs. " 47
To buttress her argument, Bozeman refers to the ideas prevailing
with regard to war in non-Western societies such as sub-Saharan Af-
rica, the Middle East, India, Southwest Asia and China. According
to her, there is a marked contrast between these ideas and the estab-
lished notions rooted in contemporary Western cultural perspectives.
Bozeman attributes the difference between the two outlooks to the
fact that in non-Western societies "peace is neither the dominant
value nor the norm in foreign relations and that war, far from being
perceived as immoral or abnormal, is viewed positively.
' '
148
Her careful dissection of non-Western attitudes towards war also
leads Bozeman to the conclusion that these are at variance with the
priorities officially set in the Charter of the U.N. and affiliated inter-
national organizations or that, contrary to what is commonly as-
sumed, the United Nations does not reflect universally shared norms.
Bozeman's point appears to have some validity. The distinction,
however, which she draws between Western and non-Western per-
spectives is possibly too general to be useful. Views on whether war is
ever justifiable are divided along several additional lines and cannot be
146. See Margolis, The Concepts of War and Peace, 6 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 209, 214
(1960).
147. Bozeman, War and the Clash of Ideas, 20 ORmsS 61, 102 (1976).
148. Id.
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effectively conceptualized in dichotomous terms. A more refined
analysis would suggest at least the following categories: Western, So-
viet, Chinese and Third World. Due considerations should also be
given to perspectives which have their roots in established religions
and which do not necessarily overlap with national policies.
III. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TOWARDS THE LEGALITY/
JUSTNESS OF WAR
A. The Western Approach
As noted, the Western approach is the one which reflects most
closely traditional international norms, although the lack of a unitary
political base, the occasional divergence of interests and the prolifera-
tion of intellectual perspectives among the nations that form the
"western world" 149 may render the identification of a coherent doc-
trine a rather difficult task. Notwithstanding this, there are sufficient
common elements in the attitudes of the individual Western states
and an attempt at a generalization is therefore appropriate.
Western states have always asserted their unqualified support for
the various formal documents renouncing the use of force in interna-
tional relations. Perhaps the most explicit statement of the Western
position on the legality of war can be traced to the United States inter-
pretation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as enunciated by Henry Stim-
son, then United States Secretary of State:
War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Bri-
and-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal
throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the
source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be a principle
around which the duties, the conduct and the rights of nations re-
volve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter when two nations engage in
armed conflict either one or both of them must be wrongdoers -
violators of this general treaty law. We no longer draw a circle
149. Differences within the Western bloc have manifested themselves on numerous occa-
sions: in 1959 when Gaulist France had partially forsaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO), in 1973-74 when European States refused to support the United States in its
aid to Israel and in its dealing with the Arab oil-producers, in 1974 when the enmity between
Greece and Turkey, two NATO members, erupted in the Cyprus crisis (after which Greece,
and recently Turkey, reduced their ties to NATO), and in the lack of support shown by
Europeans to the United States-engineered Camp David Accords and the serious disagreement
over the construction of a Soviet gas pipeline to Europe. On the multipolarization of the
world's political system which rules out consideration in terms of "blocs," see Mushkat, Gro-
tius and the Changing Image of the Present International System and its Legal Order and
Political Disorder, I GROTIANA 53 (1980).
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around them and treat them with the punctilios of the duelist's
code. Instead we denounce them as law breakers. By the very act,
we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the
legal profession the task of reexamining many of its codes and
treaties. 150
This conviction motivated Western states to lend strong approval to a
similar proscription of force, as promulgated in article 2(4) of the
Charter.' 5 ' Their declared position since has been that "whatever its
grievances a state cannot justify initiating war, that whatever its inter-
ests a state should not resort to war to preserve or protect these inter-
ests." 152 In other words, wars as instruments of national policy are
regarded as definitely unjust. At the same time, wars as instruments
of international policy, that is, in self-defense or collective defense
against overt aggression, waged in accordance with the Charter's re-
quirements and subject to the collective judgment of the United Na-
tions are generally supported by Western decision-makers. Indeed,
United States officials representing their government in international
bodies can be quoted as reaffirming the "commitment" of the United
States "to the world of the Charter" which was said to express "both
[the United States'] deepest philosophical traditions and the most re-
alistic interpretation of [the United States'] national interest."'
153
However, while Western statesmen repeatedly profess commit-
ment to the Charter, in practice their devotion to peaceful means of
persuasion has not been particularly consistent, nor without limits. 154
Notwithstanding the general deference to international rule of law,
Western states have contrived on several occasions to expand the
range of permissible uses of force, utilizing for this purpose various
instruments and institutional devices. The rationale for violence to
150. Stimson, The Pact of Paris, Three Years of Development, 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. 1932, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 577-78 (1948).
151. Two countries, Japan and Italy, have included a renunciation of the threat of force or
the use of force as a means for settling international disputes in their respective constitutions.
See references by the national representatives in 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 4) paras. 225, 250,
U.N. Doc. A/37/41 (1982).
152. R. TUCKER, THE JUST WAR: A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN DOCTRINE
12 (1960).
153. 5 THE DYNAMICS OF WORLD POWER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1945-1973 at 283 (A. Schlesinger ed. 1973) (quoting an excerpt from
a speech given by Ambassador Stevenson before the Security Council regarding the Cuban
Missile Crisis).
154. Over 60 military interventions in foreign lands were undertaken by Britain, France
and the United States since 1946. See generally Tillema & Van Wingen, Law and Power in
Military Intervention: Major States After World War II, 26 INT'L STUD. Q. 220 (1982).
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which they are inclined to resort more than any other is a wide con-
struction of article 51, thus allowing an extensive use of force under
the claim of self-defense. The Western position, as expressed in the
debates of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggres-
sion, hinges on the assumption that the Charter was not intended to
restrict the customary right of individual and collective self-defense
whose traditional, broad scope is not limited by the loose terminology
used in article 51.155 This contention is further supported, in their
opinion, by the opening words of article 51 which states that
"[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense."
156
In such a vein, a former Legal Adviser of the United States De-
partment of State, Leonard Meeker, further maintains that the stipu-
lated condition of "armed attack" preceding an action in self-defense
should be interpreted not by reference to "mere form or appearance"
but rather with regard to the "substance and reality of what is going
on."' 157 Thus "defensive" measures against an act "upsetting the bal-
ance of the world"'158 or an attack of alien ideology and foreign inspi-
ration159 can be considered fully justifiable. Indeed, Meeker has noted
that "[p]articipation in the Inter-American system, to be meaningful,
must take into account the modern day reality that an attempt by a
conspiratorial group inspired from the outside to seize control by
force can be an assault upon the independence and integrity of a
155. See United Kingdom, 25 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defin-
ing Aggression (64th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR.64 (1970); United Kingdom, 25
U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (85th mtg.) at 50,
U.N. Doe. A/AC.134/SR.85 (1971); See also 18 U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item 71)
para. 61, U.N. Doc. A/5671 (1963); 25 U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item 87) para. 30,
U.N. Doc. A/8171 (1970); Report of the Special Committee on Defining Aggression, 26 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 19) paras. 38, 40, U.N. Doc. A/8419 (1971). It is also interesting to note
that the United Kingdom proposal to the Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression, which had Western support, declared lawful the use of force "in exercise of the
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense" without mention of, or restriction to,
article 51 of the Charter.
156. See, e.g., 24 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression
(38th mtg.) para. 106, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.38 (1969) (statement by the Australian
Representative).
157. Meeker, Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-Defense, 56 DEP'T ST. BULL.
54, 59 (1967).
158. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 288 (Supp. 1959-68) (statement by
the United States Representative regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis).
159. See generally 2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH, & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE 1179 (1968) (discussing the
legal basis for the United States actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965).
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state" thereby justifying an act of self-defense. 160
A similarly liberal interpretation is imposed by Western states-
men on the institution of collective self-defense. A case in point is the
Cuban Quarantine where the use of force by the United States was
justified under the wide terms of the Rio Treaty of 1947 which pro-
vided for collective action not only in the case of armed attack, but
also "if the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sover-
eignty or political independence of any American State should be af-
fected by an aggression which is not an armed attack ... or by any
other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."'
61
A clear indication of the flexible interpretation of collective self-
defense under the Charter is expressed in the following statement
made by the former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to the American
Society of International Law:
I question whether you have to be attacked yourself before you can
engage in collective self-defense. I think article 16 of the League of
Nations Covenant proclaimed that an act of aggression against any
member of the League is an act of war against all, and article 1 of
the United Nations Charter calls for effective political action
against acts of aggression against the peace. It is hard for me to see
that either one of these principles of those two great documents
could be doing anything else but proclaiming a general interest in
resisting acts of aggression. I would suppose that any nation which
is the victim of aggression has a right under international law to
seek the assistance of others who are willing to assist, and that the
general interest in suppressing acts of aggression and breaches of
the peace is a sufficient interest to support this relationship.
62
Concurrently with a liberal interpretation of military actions
amounting to individual or collective self-defense under article 51 of
the Charter, the Western alliance has displayed a restrictive approach
160. Id. at 1181; see Chayes, The Legal Casefor US Action on Cuba, 47 DEP'T ST. BULL.
763, 765 (1962). On the other hand, a similarly permissive interpretation was not allowed by
the United States in relation to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the words of United
States Ambassador to the United Nations, Donald F. McHenry: "The Soviet claim that it was
acting in furtherance of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter is a perversion of
the Charter - an insult to the intelligence of the members of this Council. Article 51 can be
invoked only 'if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.' From
whence came the armed attack on Afganistan?" McHenry, 80 DEP'T ST. BULL. B, C (1980)
(statement made during discussions in the U.N. regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).
161. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 6, 62 Stat. 1681,
1701, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (signed at Rio de Janeiro).
162. Frolick, A Legal Theory of Collective Security, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 125, 153
(1972) (quoting Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk).
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in relation to the proscription of use of force incorporated in article
2(4) of the Charter. Discussions at the Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression revealed that Western states favored
a literal reading of article 2(4). Accordingly, they contended that the
Charter prohibited the threat or use of force in interstate relations
only when directed at the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of another state. 163 Consequently, as asserted by the United
Kingdom Representative, "on the basis that Member States had those
rights which general international law accorded, except in so far as
they had surrendered them in accordance with the Charter, it was
possible to envisage cases other than in exercise of the right of self-
defence in which the use of force might be permissible if it did not
offend against article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter."' 64 Further-
more, some representatives pointed to the closing words of article
2(4), thus emphasizing the need to take into consideration the corre-
spondence between the goals of the state resorting to force and pur-
poses of the United Nations. 165 Indeed, Western states consistently
rejected interpretation of article 2(4) as an unqualified and absolute
prohibition of the use of force. 166 Their approach to the definition of
aggression is indicative of a perception of use of force not in strict
formal terms but as a compounded phenomenon governed by various
factors which need to be taken into consideration in order to establish
the existence of aggression.
67
Indeed, the United States' member of the Special Committee on
the Question of Defining Aggression at the concluding stage of the
Committee's sessions indicated that the first use of armed force by a
State in contravention of the Charter was only prima facie evidence of
an act of aggression; the Security Council might or might not in the
163. United Kingdom, 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (805th mtg.) para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
SR.805 (1963); see also sources cited supra note 59.
164. 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (805th mtg.) para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.805 (1963).
165. Canada, 23 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression
(11 th mtg.) at 129, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 11 (1968); 25 U.N. GAOR Special Committee
on the Question of Defining Aggression (56th mtg.) at 25-26, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.56
(1970); United States, 24 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggres-
sion (44th mtg.) at 156, U.N. Doc. A/AC 134/SR.44 (1969).
166. See, e.g., Australia, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1478th mtg.) para. 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
SR. 1478 (1974); Austria, 27 U.N. GAOR (2085th plen. mtg.) para. 54, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2085
(1972).
167. See, e.g., France, 25 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression (57th mtg.) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.57 (1970); Australia, 29 U.N. GAOR
C.6 (1478th mtg.) para. 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1478 (1974); Canada, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6
(1473d mtg.) para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1473 (1974).
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particular case find that there had actually been an action of aggres-
sion. In arriving at such a decision, repeated the United States Repre-
sentative, the Security Council "would be well advised to give due
weight to all relevant circumstances"' 168 and "bear in mind the pur-
poses of the states involved."' 69 The British delegate similarly elabo-
rated that the first use of force could not be accepted as a "conclusive
factor [of aggression], even on aprimafacie view; other circumstances
of the case, which included but were not limited to the presence or
absence of aggressive intent must also be taken into account.' 170 The
United Kingdom Representative emphasized that his delegation "had
been able to agree to the deletion from article 2 [of the Definition of
Aggression] of the specific reference to 'purposes' on the understand-
ing that the reference to 'other relevant circumstances' necessarily
covered a reference to 'purposes.' ",171
Such a contextual approach was clearly expressed by the British
Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Pierson Dixon, who explained
his country's action in the Suez crisis as follows:
[I]t is... certainly not true to say that every armed action consti-
tutes aggression. Every action must clearly be judged in the light
of circumstances in which it has taken place and the motives which
have prompted it. The action of France and the United Kingdom
is not aggression. We do not seek the domination of Egypt or of
any part of Egyptian territory. Our purpose is peaceful, not war-
like. Our aim is to re-establish the rule of law, not to violate it; to
protect, and not to destroy. What we have undertaken is a tempo-
rary police action necessitated by the turn of events in the Middle
East and occasioned by the imperative need not only to protect the
vital interests of my own and many other countries, but also to
take immediate measures for the restoration of order. 172
Other "legitimate" causes and permissive circumstances were
cited throughout the practice of Western states as justifications for the
168. 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 23, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
169. Id. at 24.
170. U.N. GAOR C.6 (1477th mtg.) para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1477 (1974).
.171. 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 31, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
172. This statement was made in the First Emergency Special Session which occurred
between the 10th and 11 th Sessions of the Security Council. A similar argument was later
forwarded by the French Representative who noted: "The [Government] of France ... had
taken steps which would remove the danger of hostilities and put an end to fighting. It is
designed to ensure effective separation of the belligerent[s] and also to guarantee freedom
through the canal." The French Representative emphasized that such a "police action" was
necessary in view of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations. I I U.N. SCOR (794th plen.
mtg.) at 29, U.N. Doc. S/PV.794 (1956).
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uses of force. A measure of forcible self-help was claimed, for in-
stance, by the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel Case for the
"protection of UK's legal position" and in order to "remedy an inter-
national nuisance."' 173 The United States intervention in the Domini-
can Republic in 1965 was justified as an action designed to prevent
"the establishment of another Communist government in the Western
Hemisphere."' 174 The "protection of vital [economic] interests" was
an additional reason advanced by Britain as a justification for its in-
tervention in the Suez crisis. 175  A modern version of the economic
rationale is incorporated in another United States doctrine of inter-
vention, the so-called "Carter Brown Doctrine." Formulated in Janu-
ary 1980 to repel "outside force[s]"176 in the Persian Gulf region, the
doctrine justifies military intervention "whenever necessary to protect
the [economic] resources of the Trilateral world"' 177 (or, more specifi-
cally, the right to intervene on behalf of a beleaguered government of
an oil-rich or strategically placed state which is being challenged by a
popular revolution). Legitimate economic considerations notwith-
standing, the Carter Brown Doctrine has been extended by the "Rea-
gan Codicil" of October 1981 "from one of concern with external
alignments and alliances of states in regions critical to national de-
fense to a prerogative of active intervention and suppression of popu-
larly demanded internal change in favor of a particular local elite."178
It is interesting to note that even when strict legal grounds for
using force exist, states may be inclined to support their action with
what they consider perhaps are "stronger levels" of justifications.
Thus, for instance, while the United Kingdom was clearly within its
legal rights of self-defense when exercising force against Argentina
173. 1950 I.C.J. Pleadings 296.
174. 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 744, 746 (1965) (statement by President Johnson on May 2,
1965).
175. 11 U.N. SCOR (749th plen. mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.749 (1956); 11 U.N, SCOR
(751st plen. mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.751 (1956).
176. According to one commentator, "U.S. officials including Secretary of Defense Brown
have tacitly admitted that 'outside' means also internal rebellion-a proposition that is con-
firmed by the fact that the rapid deployment force is ill-suited for meeting Soviet aggression
but is well designed for putting down local rebellions." Schwenninger, The 1980s: New Doc-
trines of Intervention or New Norms of Non-Intervention?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 423-24
(1981).
177. See Falk, The Prospect of Intervention: Exporting Counter-Revolution, 228 NATION
659, 662 (1979). For the text of President Carter's statement see 16 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 197 (Jan. 23, 1980).
178. Reisman, Critical Defense Zones and International Law: The Reagan Codicil, 76 AM.
J. INT'L L. 589, 591 (1982) (editorial comments).
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during the Falkland Islands crisis, references to various just and high
motives permeated the relevant debates in the British Parliament.
The theme running through the discussions was that of righting
wrong done and doing justice. Members of Parliament were con-
cerned to "uphold the rights of [Britain] throughout the world and
the claim of [that] country to be a defender of People's freedom
throughout the world, particularly those who look to [Britain] for
special protection as do the people in the Falkland Islands.'
7 9
Others stressed the duties to "repossess our possessions and ... rescue
our own people"'' 8 0 and "restore [the Falkland Islanders'] rights"''8
thereby remedying the grave affront suffered by the people of both the
Falkland Islands and the United Kingdom. Vociferous claims were
made on behalf of Britain "as a nation that subscribes to international
law" to uphold "the international rule of law as declared by the Se-
curity Council."'' 8 2 Resort to military action was also justified as a
necessary measure "to preserve principles of freedom and democ-
racy"' 8 3 and maintain "territorial integrity" and national self-
respect. 8
4
On the other hand, the lack of justification on the enemy's part
was constantly emphasized by the British Parliamentarians who
turned the spotlight not on whether an act of aggression had oc-
curred, but who committed it, against whom and for what. 85 They
thus were more inclined to approve of a military action directed
"against a dictator who has [unprovokedly] invaded British territory
to bolster his regime and divert attention from domestic disorder and
brutality."
86
More common, however, are the justifications offered on human-
itarian grounds. Western states have consistently asserted, for in-
stance, the right to use force to protect the lives of nationals. Thus,
when justifying British action in the Suez, the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom told the British Parliament: "We do maintain, and
I think I must fairly say, that there is nothing in the Tripartite Decla-
ration or in the Charter which abrogates the right of a Government to
179. 21 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 639 (Apr. 3, 1982).
180. Id. at 642.
181. Id. at 959 (Apr. 7, 1982).
182. Id. at 1014.
183. 22 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 275 (Apr. 21, 1982).
184. Id. at 1026 (Apr. 29, 1982).
185. Id. at 997.
186. Id.
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take such steps as are essential to protect the lives of their citizens and
vital rights such as are here at stake."'' 1 7 Similar reasoning was em-
ployed by the United Kingdom Representative explaining his coun-
try's support in the Congo Operation:
The issue which faced my Government was simply this. In defi-
ance of every provision of international law and the basic princi-
ples of humanity many hundred non-combatants.., had been held
for months as hostages .... All appeals . . . for their safety and
release had been of no avail .... We clearly understood that the
object of the operation was solely one of saving lives.' 88
A year later, Ambassador Banker defended the Dominican Republic
intervention as the dispatch of forces "purely and solely for humanita-
rian purposes, for the protection of lives not only of the United States
citizens but the lives of citizens of other countries as well."' 1 9 The
"need to save European lives" was referred to by France to justify its
intervention in Zaire in May 1978.190 Perhaps the most explicit affir-
mation of the right of states to use force to protect the lives of nation-
als is contained in United States Ambassador Scranton's statement in
the Security Council on the question of the Entebbe incident:
Israel's action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a tem-
porary breach of the territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally
such a breach would be impermissible under the Charter of the
United Nations. However, there is a well established right to use
limited force for the protection of one's own nationals from an im-
minent threat of injury or death in a situation where the state in
whose territory they are located either is unwilling or unable to
protect them. The right flowing from the right of self-defense is
limited to such use of force as is necessary and appropriate to pro-
tect threatened nationals from injury. 19 1
And in a memorandum issued by the United States Office of Legal
Adviser that year, it was confirmed that "the legitimacy of foreign
state intervention in ... situations of civil disorder for the rescue of
the lives of nationals as well as nonnationals where the legitimate gov-
ernment is incapable of rendering the required protection is also up-
187. Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of Inter-
national Law-Survey and Comment 111, 6 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 301, 326 (1957) (quoting the
British Prime Minister's address of October 30, 1956).
188. 19 U.N. SCOR (1175th plen. mtg.) para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1175 (1964).
189. 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 834 (1965).
190. Le Monde, May 23, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
191. 31 U.N. SCOR (1941st plen. mtg.) at 31, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1941 (1976).
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held by traditional international law under the separate doctrine of
humanitarian intervention."' 192 Furthermore, according to the British
Ambassador, states may have a duty to exercise the right to use force
for the protection of their nationals, since "states exist for the protec-
tion of their peoples."1
93
Besides a most liberal interpretation of the exceptions from the
principle of non-use of force in international relations, Western states
tend to employ another technique to license the use of force in situa-
tions other than those contemplated when the Charter of the U.N.
was drafted, namely, that of resorting to satellite regional organiza-
tions for the purpose of legitimizing unilateral uses of armed force
initiated without such approval. For example, following the Domini-
can Republic intervention, President Johnson noted that because the
United States was a member of the Organization of American States
(OAS), it had assumed a common responsibility for dealing with
Communist infiltration into the Western Hemisphere. The United
States acted unilaterally because of time pressures, but later invited
troops from other OAS nations to join in the action.
194
Closely connected to the above claim is the extremely restrictive
interpretation imposed by Western authorities on circumstances in
which approval of the Security Council is required under article 53 as
to enforcement action taken by regional agencies. The official United
States position, for instance, has been that no prior approval of the
Security Council is necessary to legitimize an enforcement action by
regional organizations; rather it was sufficient that the Security Coun-
cil had not disapproved the action. 195 Indeed, according to Legal Ad-
viser Meeker, both the U.N. and OAS are "mutually reinforcing" and
"[t]here should be no doctrinaire assumption that the United Nations
and its Security Council are the exclusive guardians of world
peace."' 196 An attempt, however, by the United Kingdom (with the
support of other Western countries) to introduce into the Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States a clause declaring the use of force lawful when under-
192. E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
1976 at 7 (1977) (citing the applicable memorandum issued by the United States Office of
Legal Adviser).
193. 31 U.N. SCOR (1940th plen. mtg.) para. 107, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1940 (1976).
194. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1965, at 2, col. 2.
195. See Legal Basis for Quarantine in Cuba, reprinted in A. CHAYES, THE CUBA MISSILE
CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 146 (1974).
196. Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law, 53 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 60 (1965).
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taken by a "regional agency acting in accordance with the Charter"
was unsuccessful.
19 7
Another aspect related to the Western attempts to preserve a cer-
tain freedom of action with regard to the interstate use of force is their
limited view of the scope of the principle of non-intervention. Obser-
vations were made, for instance, during the discussions on the Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among
States that in an interdependent world it was inevitable and even de-
sirable that states be concerned with, and try to influence, the actions
and policies of other states. Explaining their position, Western dele-
gates emphasized that the objective of international law was not to
prevent intervention, but rather to ensure its compatibility with other
principles of international law such as sovereign equality of states and
self-determination of their peoples. Indeed, it was further suggested
that too rigid a formulation of the rules on non-intervention might
lead to serious contractions when one came to study the principles of
equal rights and self-determination. 98
The reluctance of the Western states to commit themselves to
overly narrow concepts of self-defense and collective measures li-
censed under the Charter is not coupled, however, with an equally
elastic attitude towards wars of national liberation. 199 Indeed, the op-
position mounted by the Western alliance to the legitimization of for-
cible actions against colonial regimes was strong both in terms of its
expression and the underlying consensus.
Western representatives insisted that "the Charter made no ex-
ception in proscribing the use of force in international relations (Arti-
cle 2, paragraph 4), so as to permit States to use arms against other
States in support of what might be called colonial conflicts. ' ' 2°° In
fact, they argued, no legal system could possibly grant a right of rebel-
lion as this would destroy the legal system itself.
201
197. 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States (8th mtg.) para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/AC.1 19/L.8 (1964).
198. See, e.g., United Kingdom, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States (26th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 119/SR.26 (1964); United
States, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States (29th mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.1 19/SR.29 (1964); Netherlands, 19 U.N. GAOR
Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (30th mtg.) at 15,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. I 19/SR.30 (1964).
199. Australia, 23 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggres-
sion (8th mtg.) at 83, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.8 (1968).
200. Id.
201. 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) para. 168, U.N. Doc. A/7619 (1969).
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Similarly, Western states could not accept claims justifying wars
of national liberation based on the right of self-defense which, they
considered, was only applicable in international relations whereas re-
lations between a colonizing power and the colonized people were not
international in scope. They also emphasized that self-defense could
only be invoked against armed force while ideological or economic
coercion did not fall within the realm of article 51.202 Furthermore, it
was pointed out by Western delegates that expressly mentioning a
right of self-defense against colonial domination would encourage a
nation to employ force, contrary to the principles of the United Na-
tions, with the effect of greatly increasing tension and endangering
international peace and security.
20 3
In the course of discussions on the Question of Defining Aggres-
sion, Western representatives were adamant that "in the field of inter-
state relations it would not be possible to accept.. . that an act, which
would under all other circumstances be defined as aggression, would
not be considered aggression, if it was committed in the context of
self-determination. ' ' 204 Western objections to excepting self-determi-
nation struggles from being characterized as aggression under article
3 manifested themselves strongly in relation to the interpretation of
article 7 of the Consensus Definition.20 5
202. United Kingdom, 23 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression (11 th mtg.) at 125, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 11 (1968); France, 23 U.N. GAOR
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (17th mtg.) at 163, U.N. Doc. A/
AC. 134/SR. 17 (1968).
203. Sweden, 19 U.N. GAOR, Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States (10th mtg.) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.10 (1964); United States, 19 U.N.
GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (15th mtg.)
at 15, 19, U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.15 (1964); United Kingdom, 19 U.N. GAOR Special
Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (16th mtg.) at 14, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 119/SR. 16 (1964).
204. Australia, 26 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggres-
sion (84th mtg.) at 32, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR.84 (1971); see also United Kingdom, 23 U.N.
GAOR Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (11 th mtg.) at 125, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.134/SR.11 (1968); United Kingdom, 25 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression (73d mtg.) at 94, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.73 (1970); 25
U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item 87) para. 35, U.N. Doc. A/8171 (1970).
205. Article 7 states that
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the
right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter,
of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples
under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of
these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance
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Basically, it was argued that no interpretation could be accepted
which contradicted the provisions of the U.N. Charter concerning use
of force. Thus, according to the Italian delegate, neither article 7, nor
the Preamble could legitimize actions disrupting the territorial integ-
rity of states complying with the Charter.2 0 6 The Dutch Representa-
tive warned "against interpreting the affirmation of the right of
peoples concerned to receive support as legitimization of armed sup-
port" since the Charter allowed no such exception. "Peoples which
did not enjoy democratic government deserved support," he contin-
ued, "but not . . . armed support. ' 20 7 Similarly, the Canadian posi-
tion was that "struggles of peoples means struggle by peaceful means
... Article 7 could not be interpreted to license the use of force or to
condone assault contrary to the Charter on the territorial integrity or
dismemberment of any state by violent means. ' 20  And the Belgian
Representative restated his Government's view that the "use of vio-
lence as a means of settling ... conflicts ... was inadmissable" and
article 7 could not sanction resort to force beyond the limits set by the
Charter.20
9
Additional arguments offered by the United States delegate in
this connection referred to the inconsistency with the immediately
preceding article 6, which rules out any construction enlarging the
scope of lawful force under the Charter, and of any interpretation
legitimizing acts of force which would otherwise be illegal under the
Charter. 210 The Portuguese Representative also pointed out a possi-
ble contradiction with article 5(1) of the Definition which stipulates
that "no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, eco-
nomic, military or otherwise, may serve as justification of aggression."
He further argued that article 7 could not be read as derogating from
article 3(g) and excluding the use of armed bands in struggles for self-
determination from the definition of aggression. If, as against article
3 as a whole, article 7 was given the meaning claimed by way of dero-
gation from it of paragraph (g) which sanctions armed force for self-
determination, this would also involve similar derogations from all
with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned
Declaration.
69 AM. J. INT'L L. 480, 483 (1975) (reprinting the U.N. Definition of Aggression, Resolution
334 (xxix)).
206. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1472d mtg.) para. 22, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1472 (1974).
207. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1473d mtg.) para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1473 (1974).
208. Id. at para. 15.
209. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1476th mtg.) para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1476 (1974).
210. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1480th mtg.) paras. 72-73, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1480 (1974).
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the other stigmatized acts. Such an interpretation, asserted the Portu-
guese delegate, would produce the absurd result of legalizing "for the
solution of certain disputes, those very means which the definition
defined as constituting illicit aggression.
' 2"
Other representatives questioned the very relevance of article 7 in
a Definition of Aggression. As contended by the British delegate, a
definition of aggression was concerned with acts of one state against
another state. For this reason, he insisted that the reference to self-
determination struggles in article 7 was not directly relevant to the
Definition, so the clause achieved no more than the preservation of
the legitimacy of struggles by means other than the use of force.
2 12
This, in essence, was also the position of the French Representative
who maintained that article 7 was "alien to the text" since it did not
relate to "aggression as defined in article 1, i.e., between sovereign
states."
213
The Western approach can thus be described as one which seeks
pragmatic compromise and wishes to minimize disruptive change in
the international system. Western states extend formal support to the
principle of non-use of force but their adherence to it by no means
verges on the dogmatic. They are willing to permit the use of force
within the framework of the existing international norms liberally in-
terpreted, particularly if the use of force is geared towards the preser-
vation of the present international status quo.
B. The Soviet Approach
Summarizing the Soviet view of war, 214 Vigor states that the un-
derlying assumption is that war is essentially evil. It is also inevitable,
however, as long as class societies exist. 21 5 Until such time when a
truly classless Communist society is established over the whole of our
211. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1478th mtg.) para. 22, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1480 (1974).
Similar arguments were expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany, id. at para. 15, and
Spain, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1472d mtg.) para. 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1472 (1974).
212. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1477th mtg.) paras. 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1477 (1974).
213. 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 22, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974); see also United
States, id. at 24.
214. P. VIGOR, THE SOVIET VIEW OF WAR, PEACE, NEUTRALITY 155-222 (1975).
215. It should be noted that the Leninist theory of the inevitability of war between Capital-
ism and Communism has been modified to suit the change in circumstances (no longer is it
economically advantageous for the Capitalists to engage in a war against Communism given
the Communists' military strength). The basic Marxist doctrine, however, remains that wars
are inevitable as long as Capitalism persists; though wars may not manifest themselves as
struggles between Communism and Capitalism, they arise as conflicts between Capitalism and
anyone else. See id. at 23-25.
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planet, war may be a necessary tool to promote the revolutionary
cause. In other words, to use war to further the cause of Communism
is, from the Marxist point of view, to do a little evil in order that
much good may result.
By the same token, Marxism has traditionally condemned paci-
fism for being both theoretically unsound and dangerous because it
does not distinguish between just and unjust wars (pacifists oppose all
wars).216 It was maintained by Marx, Engels, Lenin and their disci-
ples that since pacifists fail to see war as a product of social contradic-
tions, they are equally blind to its role in furthering social causes.
217
This point has been expounded by Lider with some lucidity. Total
ban, he observes:
puts confusion into the minds of men by diverting their attention
from the true cause of injustice and inequality; it thereby hinders
the oppressed people from becoming conscious of their true situa-
tion; it furthermore deprives them of an essential instrument for
their liberation; and it often lulls them into passivity with the worst
sort of reactionary utopianism.
218
Pacifism has, therefore, been attacked as one of the most dangerous
enemies of forces aimed at national and social transformation.
Not all wars, however, are equally justifiable under the Marxist
doctrine. Wars are classified as either just or unjust and the Soviet
Union claims to support the former and oppose the latter:
219
Unjust, predatory wars waged by the reactionary exploiting circles
hamper and check the progress of human society, by increasing the
exploitation of the oppressed classes and nations, while defending
all which is old, obsolete and reactionary and smothering all which
is new, developing and revolutionary .... Contrary to this, just
liberatory wars.., are progressive and revolutionary, because they
destroy old, harmful and reactionary institutions which hinder the
free progress of nations, while liberating the oppressed mankind
from the capitalist slavery and liberating nations from the imperial-
ist oppression, creating conditions for independence and national
development of nations and dependent countries.
220
Included in the category of just wars are wars waged by the people for
216. J. LIDER, ON THE NATURE OF WAR 239 (1977).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 227 (quoting F. Khrustov).
220. Id.
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liberation from social oppression (i.e., civil wars),221 from national op-
pression (i.e., wars of national liberation), in defense of national inde-
pendence (i.e., against foreign attack), or against imperialist
aggression. Unjust wars, on the other hand, embrace wars waged by
the exploiting classes in order to suppress the struggle for liberty of an
exploited class or nation, or to annex other people's territory or to
enslave or rob them.222
This distinction between just and unjust wars has acquired a ju-
ridical aspect in the Definition of Aggression as perceived by the Sovi-
ets. Accordingly, any aggressive war is unjust and vice versa.
Similarly every just war is a defensive war against various forms of
aggression. Indeed:
the Soviet Union's political thinking has long taken it as self evi-
dent that aggression is characteristic of the Western world, as
deeply rooted in the nature of Capitalism; and orthodox Commu-
nist doctrine excludes the possibility that any Soviet war could be a
war of aggression, since, it is argued, aggressive attitudes contra-
dict the inner structure of the socialist society, so that the foreign
policy of the Soviet Union must always be peaceful. At the same
time wars of national liberation from 'Capitalist exploitation' and
'colonial oppression' are deemed just wars which cannot be desig-
nated aggressive' in the Soviet sense.223
Thus, while lending their official support to a narrowly formu-
lated definition of aggression, 22 4 the Soviet criterion for just wars has
not been abandoned. New shades may be detected, however, in the
meaning of the term "just." As suggested by Lider, 225 in the original
sense "just aims" were those which clearly furthered the interests of
the working cause of nations fighting for liberation which was consid-
ered to be indirectly in the interest of the working class. Today, the
221. The Communist meaning of the term "civil war" is not synonymous with the legal
significance of civil war as understood by non-Communist states. "Civil war according to the
Communist doctrine, can be consistent with a civil strife between insurgents and its [sic] par-
ent state as well as with a war between two or several states. What alone characterizes a civil
war in the Communist doctrine is its cause which must consist of a class struggle." See L.
KOTZSCH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
68 (1956).
222. P. VIGOR, supra note 214, at 156 (quoting the latest edition of BOLSHAYA SOVIET-
SKAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIA).
223. J. STONE, supra note 51, at 114 n.28, 115 n.31.
224. See Litvinov Definition of Aggression of 1933; see also Report of the United Nations
Secretary General on the Question of Defining Aggression, 7 U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda
Item 54) at 34, U.N. Doe. A/2211 (1952).
225. J. LIDER, supra note 216, at 222.
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emphasis is on promoting long-range interests of Socialism, and
hence, the aims of those who work for the "cause of peace" and "in-
dependence of nations" are included in the category of "just.' '226
Nonetheless, in practice "just wars are those which are waged in
the Soviet interest"227 and for the determination of the legalities in-
volved, the Soviets rely on their own characterization of the situation.
Thus, for instance, they regarded the Korean War in 1950 as aggres-
sive and unjust, while deeming the interventions in Hungary (1956)
and Czechoslovakia (1968) as progressive from a Socialist point of
view.
228
The Soviet representative was, therefore, expressing the classical
Soviet position when he told a Security Council debating the Czecho-
slovakian intervention: "I am proud of the fact that here in this
Council I defend a just cause. ' 229 Expounding the nature of this
cause, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, invoked the con-
cept of a Socialist commonwealth (which he called an inseparable en-
tity) 230 to defend his country's actions before the 23rd Session of the
General Assembly: "The Socialist states cannot and will not allow a
situation where the vital interests of socialism are infringed upon and
encroachments are made on the inviolability of the boundaries of the
Socialist commonwealth."' 23' More explicit in identifying the per-
ceived threat to the vital interest of the Soviet community as a justi-
fied ground for forcible intervention was Secretary Brezhnev in his
comments on the Soviet invasion to the Fifth Congress of the Polish
Communist Party. Mr. Brezhnev insisted that Communist countries
stood for "strict respect" for sovereignty, but added:
[W]hen internal and external forces that are hostile to Socialism
try to turn the development of some Socialist country towards the
restoration of a capitalist regime, when Socialism in that country
and the Socialist community as a whole is threatened, it becomes
not only a problem of the people of the country concerned, but a
226. See, e.g., the claim made by the USSR concerning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslova-
kia to the effect that the military measures undertaken by them served the cause of peace and
were directed towards the strengthening of peace. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security
Council 172 (Supp. 1966-1968).
227. B. RAMUNDO, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 128 (1967).
228. Id.
229. 16 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 22967 (Oct. 12-19, 1968).
230. The "Socialist commonwealth" seems to have been presently extended by the Soviets
to include any state signing a treaty of friendship with Moscow (e.g. Afghanistan).
231. Gibson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 559, 569 (1969).
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common problem and concern of all Socialist countries.
232
In a similar vein, United States actions in Vietnam were charac-
terized by the Soviets as "aggression which jeopardised international
peace and security" while the Vietnamese operations were portrayed
as an "heroic" struggle ... for their territorial integrity and political
independence" and a "major factor for ensuring peace and secur-
ity. ' 233 More recently, the invasion of Afghanistan was justified as an
operation "[t]o give aid to a country which request[ed] it for coun-
tering aggression [which] is not only a noble cause from the point of
view of modern international morality, [but] it is also a fully legiti-
mate one from the point of view of international law.
'234
While attempting to confer a semblance of legality on wars
fought in defense of policy goals and objectives to which the Soviet
Union is committed, the Soviets are at the same time anxious to limit
the use of force by Capitalist states. Indicative of this ambivalence in
the Soviet approach, is the campaign of the Soviet bloc in support of a
much broader interpretation of the proscription of force that would
include within the ambit of the term force, economic, political and
other forms of coercion falling short of armed force. This argument is
based on the proposition that nonmilitary forms of pressure, for ex-
ample, the complete or partial interruption of economic relations, are
often far more potent in their effects than actual armed force, and that
for this reason, the Charter should be interpreted progressively or ge-
nerically in light of developments in the world community since the
Charter was first drafted. 235
By the same token, the notion of genuine interrelationships
among states, accompanied by a certain degree of inevitable mutual
influence or pressure, 236 has been firmly resisted in Soviet circles and
the prohibition against interference of any kind strongly reaffirmed.
Conversely, the mission to support proletarian movements abroad
and a deep conviction in the inevitability and justness of their cause
232. 16 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 23027 (Nov. 16-23, 1968).
233. Rybakov, Aggression and International Law, 8 INT'L AFF. Moscow 38, 39 (1980).
234. Id. at 46.
235. See, e.g., Czechoslovakia, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States (4th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.4 (1964); Czecho-
slovakia, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States (8th mtg.) at 4-6, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 119/SR.8 (1964); 33 U.N. GAOR Special Commit-
tee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force (10th mtg.) para. 58,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.193/SR.10 (1978).
236. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 68, at 261.
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has led the Soviet legal community to urge, officially and unofficially,
that assistance to wars of national liberation or analogous situations
fall outside the scope of intervention, is not unlawful, and is under-
taken pursuant to other norms of international law.
237
It is the Soviet thesis in this regard that colonial domination and
subjugation, irrespective of its sources, constitutes an act of flagrant
aggression against dependent people and, as a corollary, that the latter
may use force in self-defense to preserve their national identity and
achieve their independence.23 8 The following excerpt from an article
published in a leading Soviet legal journal clearly expresses this thesis:
The national-liberation war of a dependent people against the colo-
nial power will always be a just, defensive war from the political as
well as the legal standpoint, independently of who initiated the mil-
itary action. The whole thing is that in the given instance the fact
of initiation of a national-liberation war by a dependent colonial
country has no significance for the determination of the aggressor,
since the state of dependency and disenfranchisement of the colo-
nial peoples is the result of an imperialist aggression committed
earlier, expressing itself in the annexation of these territories. This
means that the national-liberation war begun by a dependent, dis-
enfranchised people will represent but a lawful act on its part in
response to an act of aggression committed earlier by the imperial-
ist state which led to the forcible enslavement of the said people
and territory which it occupies. The people of a dependent or colo-
nial country preserve the right to counter action to an imperialist
aggression for the duration of the whole period of annexation of
the given country or part of its territory. At any moment the op-
pressed people, living on the territory annexed by the imperialist
state, have the right to launch a national-liberation struggle against
this imperialist state. Such a struggle will be just and legitimate,
since, in the first place, neither aggression nor annexation enjoy the
237. See Butler, Soviet Attitudes Toward Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 380, 391-92 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
238. See, e.g., statements by representatives of Soviet bloc nations in the course of debates
by the Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States as follows:
USSR, 19 U.N. GAOR (5th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.5 (1964); USSR, 21 U.N.
GAOR (86th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.86 (1968); Czechoslovakia, 19 U.N. GAOR
(4th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/AC. I 19/SR.4 (1964); Rumania, 19 U.N. GAOR (7th mtg.), U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 119/SR.7 (1964). Note also the statement by the GDR Representative who indi-
cated that "[a]s colonial rule, apartheid and other forms of alien suppression constituted per-
manent aggression against the oppressed peoples, resistance against those forms of external use
of force and suppression was an act of self-defense." 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 Special Committee
on the Question of Defining Aggression (1476th mtg.) para. 15, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1476
(1974).
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benefits of a statute of limitations, and, in the second place, inter-
national law forbids aggression and consequent annexation puts
them outside the law.
2 3 9
Again, in order to propound this thesis, Soviet legal theorists have
contrived to adjust other theories which they also support. For one
thing, they have had to broaden somewhat the scope of their basic
definition of subjects of international law (otherwise very restrictively
understood) as well as extend their definition of aggression, which ap-
plies only to actions lying within the realm of interstate relations, to
cover military hostilities in colonies. Thus, by asserting that any
struggle between a colonial power and a native independence move-
ment amounts to a formal international war since it represents an
armed collision between two distinct entities each fully acknowledged
as a subject of international law in its own right, the Soviets are ulti-
mately able to claim that such a clash should be automatically judged
in the light of whether aggression has been committed.
In reality, as one commentator observes:
[T]he Soviets bother little with a detailed assessment of the circum-
stantial evidence in such instances, for, thanks to a priori reason-
ing, the answer is immediately forthcoming from them that such
outbreaks of violence definitely represent every time a case of ag-
gression, since one party to the contest must be pursuing a colonial
policy which has provoked the fighting and the resulting colonial
wars stand ipso facto condemned as acts of deliberate aggresion. 24
0
Wars of national liberation are further justified by the Soviets as
enforcement actions pursuant to recognized norms of international
law. This reasoning notes that the Charter and general international
law, having endorsed the "principle of equal rights and self determi-
nation of peoples," impose a parallel legal duty on states to give effect
to this principle, that is, bring an end to colonialism and ensure peo-
ple self-government and independence. The peoples of the colonies, in
turn, given the inalienable24I and sacred242 nature of their right, are
239. Ginsburg, "Wars of National Liberation" and the Modern Law of Nations-The So-
viet Thesis, in THE SOVIET IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 66, 76-77 (H. Baade ed. 1965).
240. Id. at 75.
241. See use of the term in 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1474th mtg.) para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
SR.1474 (1974) (Mongolia); 27 U.N. GAOR (2079th plen. mtg.) para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/
PV.2079 (1972) (Poland); 27 U.N. GAOR (2080th plen. mtg.) para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2080
(1972) (Czechoslovakia).
242. While addressing the General Assembly in 1960 Chairman Krushchev introduced the
following formula with regard to recourse to arms of an "oppressed people": "We welcome
the sacred struggle of the colonial peoples for their liberations .... Moral, material and other
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"fully entitled with arms in hand to seek liberation from the yoke of a
colonial power evading a peaceful settlement of the said question and
be the first to start military action against it with the object of destroy-
ing its military forces stationed in these countries. ' '
243
In terms of just versus unjust wars, colonialism is classified as a
fundamentally evil institution and an offense against basic precepts of
international law, so that there is a certain inherent justice in its eradi-
cation, even by force. By contrast, the principle of self-determination
of peoples is inherently progressive 244 and its realization represents a
condition of universal peace.245 Use of force is, therefore, justifiable to
obliterate this unspeakable evil, to reinstate justice and to reestablish
violated rights.
246
Soviet duplicity concerning the proscription of use of force is re-
vealed again when a distinction is drawn with respect to the self-deter-
mination exception between dissident movements and people fighting
colonial oppression. Force used against the former, the Soviets argue,
qualifies as a legitimate police action and falls consequently within the
definition of self-defense.
247
The Soviet approach to the right of self-defense also reflects the
ambivalence of an effort to restrict the use of the right by Capitalist
states, while expanding it to accommodate the interest of the Soviet
Union. The basic Soviet position is that the right to use force in self-
defense has been limited by article 51 of the U.N. Charter, so that
recourse to self-defense must be compatible with the requirements of
the article. Put another way, the Soviets seek to restrict the opportu-
nities for invoking the right of self-defense to situations expressly en-
visaged by article 51, that is, cases where an armed attack has
occured, to the exclusion of every other act such as provocation or
any anticipatory self-defense.
assistance must be given so that the sacred and just struggle of the peoples for their indepen-
dence can be brought to its conclusion." 15 U.N. GAOR (869th plen. mtg.) para. 223, U.N.
Doc. A/PV.869 (1960).
243. Ginsburg, supra note 239, at 144.
244. B. RAMUNDO, supra note 227, at 144.
245. This thesis is extrapolated by Soviet jurists from the language of article 1(2) of the
Charter. See Ginsburg, supra note 239, at 83.
246. See Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Principle of Non-Use of
Force, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 41) at 39, U.N. Doc. A/34/41 (1979) (statement of USSR
Representative introducing article IV of the Draft World Treaty on Non-Use of Force in Inter-
national Relations).
247. See, e.g., 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1472d mtg.) para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.2058
(1974).
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Article 51, they argue, provides objective criteria, as distinct
from the subjective standard of national interest reflected in the prac-
tice of Western states.248 As elaborated by a Soviet jurist:
[Under] the U.N. Charter . . .the right to self-defense lawfully
arises "if an armed attack occurs" against a state. Acceptance of
[the Western] ...concept would furnish legal opportunites for
misuse of armed force in selfish interests in cases when acts of na-
tionalism, demands for the abrogation of fettering treaties, the so-
cial system and many other circumstances are arbitrarily fitted into
concept of aggression "or threat of aggression.
'249
Apart from the specific language of article 51, further limitations
on the right of self-defense hinge, according to the Soviet conception,
on the United Nations general system for the maintenance of peace
and security. Thus:
The U.N. Charter contemplates a centralized system for the appli-
cation of sanctions for the purpose of protecting the security and
rights of states .... Under these conditions, resort to the right of
self-defense is exceptional rather than the general rule. It is an ex-
traordinary and auxiliary measure because the principal measures
to protect peace and international security are entrusted to the Or-
ganization, which for this purpose operates through the Security
Council.
250
A restrictive view of the right of self-defense is also linked to the
concept of peaceful coexistence. Under Soviet theory, article 51 can-
not be interpreted or understood as superseding or weakening other
principles of peaceful coexistence such as self-determination, absten-
tion from the threat or use of force, collective measures for the main-
tenance of peace and security, or the unanimity of the permanent
members of the Security Council. 25 1
At the same time, peaceful coexistence must defer to proletarian
internationalism and solidarity with the oppressed peoples' struggle
for national liberation. Indeed, according to one Soviet commentator,
248. One may question, however, the objectivity claimed for the "armed attack" formula-
tion. Ramundo notes that "[tihe objectivity intended is 'socialist objectivity,' i.e., a formula-
tion which, like similar formulations in the Soviet lexicon, (e.g., 'socialist realism,' 'socialist
democracy,' and 'socialist internationalism') invites characterizations in the Soviet interest."
B. RAMUNDO, supra note 227, at 130.
249. Id. at 129-30 (quoting Molodstov, Mirnoe Uregulirovanie Territorial' nykh sporov i
Voprosov o Granitsakh [Peaceful Settlement of Territorial Disputes and Border Questions],
SOVETSKii EZHEGODNIK 82 (1963)).
250. Id. at 130 (footnote omitted).
251. Id.
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support of wars of national liberation is in fact an affirmation of the
concept of peaceful coexistence "since the issue at stake is respect for
one of the basic principles of peaceful coexistence - the right of all
peoples to order their own life as they see fit, to be the master in their
own house. ' 252 Thus, the Soviets have laid the basis for expanding
self-defense, in their own interest, to include the use of force to resist
or punish violations of the law of peaceful coexistence which is said to
be embodied in the Charter.2
53
Soviet policy objectives are also served by their insistence on an-
other principle of peaceful coexistence, namely unanimity among the
permanent members of the Security Council, which ensures the avail-
ability of the Soviet veto to exercise a measure of control over the use
of force in international relations. Thus, the Soviet view emphasizes
the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security and restates
that application of enforcement measures should be decided upon and
undertaken solely by the Security Council.254 Similarly, any decision
by a regional organization to use coercive measures or force against a
member of the United Nations without the authorization of the Secur-
ity Council would be a breach of the Charter and illegal.255
Unlike its Western component, therefore, the Soviet approach to
the use of force in international relations has far more doctrinal un-
dertones. Notwithstanding this, the Soviet approach lacks the coher-
ence of the Western approach and contains built-in contradictions
which are difficult to reconcile at the practical level. Perhaps even
more than Western states, the Soviet Union promotes a view of war
which reflects its narrow interests and ideological imperatives.
C. The Chinese Approach
While the Soviet Union is the most powerful Communist nation
and still exerts tight control over most of its allies, some leftist govern-
252. Ponomaryov, Some Problems of the Revolutionary Movement, 5 WORLD MARXIST
REV. 8, 12 (1962).
253. The use of the right of self-defense as a basis for sustaining the legality of wars of
national liberation is discussed earlier in this article.
254. See, e.g., Rumania, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States (7th mtg.) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 119/SR.7 (1964); Rumania, 19
U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (16th
mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.I 19/SR. 16 (1974); USSR, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on
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ments have been pursuing an independent foreign policy and openly
challenging Soviet dominance. Most notable in this respect has been
China, which has emerged as a countervailing power to the Soviet
Union within the Communist bloc. Because of its defiance of Soviet
leadership and its enormous human resources, China is regarded as a
potentially major force in international politics. Thus, China merits a
separate treatment in the present context.
Several principles permeate China's ideological pronouncements
on war. These precepts, which form the basis of the Chinese attitude
towards the justifiability of war, focus upon the inevitability of war,
"bourgeois pacifism" and the distinction between just and unjust wars
alongside the principles of sovereignty, non-interference and peaceful
coexistence. 2
5 6
The starting point for any discussion of the Chinese attitude to
war is Mao's lecture on the Problem of Strategy in China's Revolution-
ary War:
War, this monster of mutual slaughter among mankind, will be
finally eliminated through the progress of human society, and in no
distant future too. But there is only one way of eliminating it,
namely to oppose war by means of war, to oppose counter-revolu-
tionary war by means of revolutionary war, to oppose national
counter-revolutionary war by means of national revolutionary war,
and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war by means of revolu-
tionary class war. There are only two kinds of wars in history, just
and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All
counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are
just. We will put an end to man's warring era with our hands, and
the war we are waging is undoubtedly part of the final war. But
the war we are confronted with is also undoubtedly part of the
greatest and most ruthless of all wars. The greatest and most ruth-
less of all unjust counter-revolutionary wars is pressing on us; and
if we did not raise the banner of a just war, the majority of man-
kind would suffer destruction. The banner of a just war of man-
kind is the banner for the salvation of mankind; the banner of
China's just war is the banner for the salvation of China. A war
which will be waged by the overwhelming majority of mankind
and of the Chinese people will undoubtedly be a just war - it will
... form a bridge leading world history into a new era. When
human society advances to the point where classes and states are
eliminated, there will no longer be any wars, whether revolutionary
256. See generally, MAO TSE-TUNG, SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG (1955) (Brit-
ish edition of Mao's Works).
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or counter-revolutionary, just or unjust, and that will be an era of
lasting [perpetual] peace for mankind. Our study of the laws of
revolutionary war starts from our will to eliminate all wars - this
is the dividing line between us Communists and all exploiting
classes.
257
Mao thus refutes what he considers to be an unprincipled peace. To
oppose war with war, in his view, is the only way to eliminate it.
"War," he says elsewhere, "can only be abolished through war - in
order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hand. ' 258 The
era of "perpetual peace" will arrive when society has reached the ideal
classless status.
259
Mao thus echoes the Leninist doctrine that "[w]ar is an inevita-
ble outcome of systems of exploitation and the source of modem war
is the imperialist system. Until the imperialist system and the exploit-
ing classes come to an end, wars of one kind or another will always
occur.
' ' 2 6 0
Hence war is inherent in capitalism; aggression and imperialism
are synonomous in the Chinese view. 26 1 The progressive nature of the
Socialist state, however, precludes it from taking an aggressive action
against others.2 62  Therefore, wars waged by Communist states
against Capitalist states are by definition just wars.
263
Unlike the Soviets, however, who assert the avoidability of all
wars between states,264 China takes the stand that local wars are inevi-
257. 1 MAO TSE-TUNG, SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 179 (1955) (British edi-
tion of Mao's Works).
258. 2 MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 256, at 229.
259. See supra text accompanying note 215.
260. Steiner, Attitudes Toward War and Disarmament, in LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PROBLEMS OF WORLD ORDER 547-48 (S. Mendlowitz ed. 1962) (quoting an excerpt from
Long Live Leninism which is generally believed to be the work of Mao although published on
April 16, 1960 under the auspices of the editorial department of Red Flag).
261. See in this connection the statement by the Chinese Representative, Ling Ch'ing, that
"the contention for world hegemony was the main content of imperialist foreign policy and
imperialism was the source of contemporary wars of aggression." 28 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1442d
mtg.) para. 73, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1442 (1973).
262. According to Mao, the Socialist system "determines that we the Chinese do not need
war, absolutely would not start a war, and absolutely must not, should not, and could not
encroach one inch on the territory of a neighboring country." J. GITTINGS, SURVEY OF THE
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: A COMMENTARY AND EXTRACTS FROM THE RECENT POLEMICS
1963-1967 at 390 (1968).
263. See E. KARDELJ, SOCIALISM AND WAR: A SURVEY OF CHINESE CRITICISM OF THE
POLICY OF COEXISTENCE 9-94 (1960) (a critique of this attitude of self-infallibility). Accord-
ing to Kardelj, such an approach can be equated with the notion that any war which I wage is
a just war. Id. at 91. Furthermore, it is contrary to Leninism.
264. The Soviets- who initially refused to take the Chinese position on the inevitability of
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table. 265 It is the Chinese view that imperialists cannot be deterred
from starting local wars. "Therefore, the Communist countries
should feel free to ignite and/or support local wars of liberation or to
respond with force to Western-initiated local wars.
'266
In fact, contrary to unjust wars initiated by the imperialists, just
wars such as national liberation wars waged against the colonialist
and revolutionary civil wars waged against the bourgeoisie in Capital-
ist countries are not only inevitable, but actually desirable, and should
be supported by all available means. 267 To quote from Mao's famous
dictum:
Yes, we are, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolu-
tionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist.
With the help of guns the Russian Communists brought about so-
cialism. We are to bring about a democratic republic. Experience
in the class struggle of the era of imperialism teaches us that the
working class and the toiling masses cannot defeat the armed bour-
geois and landlords except by the power of the gun; in this sense we
can even say the the whole world can be remoulded only with the
gun. 2
68
By the same token, "bourgeois pacifism," which opposes wars indis-
criminately, is invariably rejected by the Chinese. Rather, attention
is called to the specific nature of wars and the importance of distin-
guishing between just and unjust wars is underlined. A clear state-
ment of the Chinese position is provided by the Chairman of the
Chinese delegation in a United Nations Plenary Session on October 3,
1972:
local wars - appear to have made a concession with respect to anticolonial wars of national
liberation which they now consider unavoidable "if the imperialists try to maintain by force
their sway over other peoples." At the same time, the Soviets have remained adamant as to the
avoidability of local wars other than national liberation wars which, like other types of wars
between states, should be avoided given the risk of their escalation into a "world thermo-
nuclear and missile war." See Burin, The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War, 57
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 334, 352-53 (1963) (footnote omitted).
265. See in this connection the statement made in People's Congress to the effect that
"[w]ar is inevitable but the date of the outbreak may be delayed." 1114 CHINA NEWS ANALY-
SIs 5 (1978).
266. Burin, supra note 264, at 352.
267. Note the suggestion in China's Army newspaper that China's conflict with Vietnam
which took place in February 1979 was "a good war for China as well as being just." The
Liberation Army Daily said: "The counter-attack educated and tempered our people, consoli-
dated their unity and enhanced their patriotism and enthusiasm for transforming China."
South China Morning Post, Mar. 27, 1979, at 5, col. 4 (quoting the Liberation Army Daily).
268. See 2 MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 256, at 228-29.
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People condemn war and consider it a barbarous way of settling
disputes among mankind. But we are soberly aware that war is
inevitable so long as society is divided into classes and the ex-
ploitaton of man by man still exists. There are two categories of
wars, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust
wars. If a socialist still wants to be a socialist, he should not op-
pose all wars indiscriminately. The non-use of force in interna-
tional relations can only be conditional and not unconditional.
The condition is to realize peaceful coexistence through mutual re-
spect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggres-
sion, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and equality
and mutual benefit. And in order to realize this it is imperative to
oppose the policies of aggression and expansion of any imperialism.
When imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism of various de-
scriptions are still using force to enslave, commit aggression
against, control and threaten a majority of the countries of the
world, it is betrayal to the people of the world to advocate non-use
of force in international relations indiscriminately, without regard
to the conditions and in an absolute way.
269
Indeed, much stress is laid by the Chinese on the Maoist distinction
between just and unjust wars. They fervently contend that it is "abso-
lutely impermissible to mention in the same breath wars of aggression
and wars against aggression, which [are] different in nature. ' 270 The
waging of the former is recognized as an international crime, 27 1 and
entails an obligation on the part of the aggressor to indemnify its
victim.
272
Mao's concern with so called structural violence, that is, with the
question of who is using violence, against whom, in what sociopolitical
context, and for what purpose, has been perpetuated in modern Chi-
nese doctrine. 273 Chinese officials have repeatedly voiced the opinion
that the identification of the aggressor is more important and more
necessary than the actual definition of aggression.
274
They, consequently, have expressed their disappointment with
the United Nations Security Council's practice of attempting to bring
269. People's Republic of China Mission to the United Nations, Press Release of Oct. 3,
1972, at 10-11.
270. 28 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1442d mtg.) para. 75, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1442 (1973).
271. See Chun-yu, On the Indictment and Punishment of War Criminals, reprinted in PEO-
PLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1471 (J. Cohen & H. Chiu eds. 1974).
272. Id. at 1479 (quoting Jen Min Jih Pao).
273. See S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER 65 (1979).
274. Id. at 460.
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about a settlement while refraining from a determination of the guilty
party. In a similar vein, Chinese delegates have condemned Soviet
advocacy of a total prohibition of force in international relations as a
reactionary doctrine.
275
Consistent with such a distinction is China's unremitting support
of wars of national (or people's) liberation: "We support the revolu-
tionary wars of the oppressed nations against imperialism [and] for
their own liberation and social progress because all these. . . are just
wars. 12 76 Elaborating on the justness of such wars, a Chinese delegate
participating in the debates on the Report of the Special Committee
on the Question of Defining Aggression has reaffirmed that "[t]he op-
pressed peoples 277 had the right to use every means, up to and includ-
ing armed struggle, to win their national liberation and independence
and to safeguard the sovereignty of their States. '27 Indeed, wars of
national liberation, according to an article published in Peking, are
the only option available to people in underdeveloped areas who seek
to achieve national independence and equality. 279 Therefore, China
would join "justice-loving countries" and "fight shoulder to shoulder"
to "promote the cause of human progress.
'280
Specifically, liberation wars appear to have four doctrinal re-
quirements: (a) the antiimperialist (national) or the proletarian origin
of the war (the people); (b) limitation of the war within the boundary
of a single state or a colonial area, to avoid provoking outside oppos-
ing interference; (c) keeping the door open for Communist infiltration
and control; and (d) condemnation of any non-Communist interfer-
ence as an infringement on the people's right of national self-determi-
nation (liberation). 28 1
Furthermore, wars of national liberation are perceived by the
Chinese, according to a prominent legal scholar, as "fully consistent
with modern international law" given their nature as "wars of na-
tional self-defense conducted by colonized or semi-colonized states or
275. Id. at 240.
276. Steiner, supra note 260, at 549.
277. It should be noted that China's support of wars of national liberation extends to
struggles against "reactionary" regimes waged by the domestic proletariat of post colonial and
noncolonial nations as well. See generally P. VAN NESS, REVOLUTION AND CHINA'S FOR-
EIGN POLICY (1970).
278. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1475th mtg.) para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1475 (1974).
279. See J. HSIUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS: A STUDY OF
ATTITUDES AND PRACTICE 290 (1972).
280. 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1475th mtg.) para. 18, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1475 (1974).
281. J. HSIUNG, supra note 279, at 290.
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nations to preserve their own sovereignty, independence, unity, and
territorial integrity. 28 2
Such wars are also not at variance with the principle of peaceful
coexistence. This was clearly asserted in a reply letter written by the
Chinese Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union:
In recent years, certain persons have been spreading the argument
that a single spark from a war of national liberation or from a revo-
lutionary people's war will lead to a world conflagration destroying
the whole mankind .... Contrary to what these people say, the
wars of national liberation and the revolutionary people's wars that
have occurred since World War II have not led to a world war.
The victory of these revolutionary wars has directly weakened the
forces of imperialism and greatly strengthened the forces which
prevent the imperialists from launching a world war and which
defend world peace.
28 3
Notwithstanding its endorsement of national liberation wars, China
has purported to support only just wars of a defensive nature. Mao's
statement in this respect is illuminating: "Others may come attack us
but we shall not fight outside our borders. I say we will not be pro-
voked. Even if you invite us to come out, we will not come out, but if
you should come and attack us we will deal with you."
'284
In the view of Red Flag, however, defensive wars need not be
confined to the territory of the invaded country. So called "defensive
counter-attacks" may be "completely justified, absolutely necessary
and entirely just. ' 285  Indeed, this elusive concept of defensive
counter-attack as well as the elastic claim of self-defense have invaria-
bly been used by the Chinese in justifying their military operations.
Thus, for example, China's participation in the Korean War was
characterized as an act of self-defense against United States aggres-
sion. In view of the geographical proximity of Korea to China, the
close ties of friendship between China and Korea and the aggressive
American tendencies, the Chinese authorities considered their mili-
tary involvement "not only a help rendered to their neighbour but
282. See Cohen, China and Intervention: Theory and Practice, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR
IN THE MODERN WORLD 348, 372 (J. Moore ed. 1974) (quoting Fu Chu).
283. 6 PEKING REV., June 21, 1963, No. 25, at 14 (a Letter of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China in reply to the letter of the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963).
284. S. KIM, supra note 273, at 68.
285. Steiner, supra note 260, at 548.
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also an act of defense of their own homeland. '28 6 Similarly, China's
boundary conflict with India was justified as an exercise of self-de-
fense against preemptive Indian invasion.2 87 Such an argument was
also put forward in connection with the Sino-Soviet border clashes in
1969.288
Self-defense was also the declared reason behind China's involve-
ment in the Vietnam War for, given the "brotherly" relationship be-
tween the Chinese and the Vietnamese, aggression against the one
constituted aggression against the other.289 More recently, China in-
vaded Vietnam in what it characterized as a "defensive counter-at-
tack" following Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and other border
incidents. The Chinese authorities, wanting to teach Vietnam a les-
son, had no doubt that "the counter-attack we were compelled to
launch against the Vietnamese aggressors was a just war."' 290
Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that while China, like other
states, "can tailor the facts and manipulate the rules to rationalize...
whatever position seems to be in the immediate interest of the Chinese
state, ' 29 1 a study of the practice of the People's Republic suggests that
the Chinese use of force has been, indeed, of a limited and defensive
character; "in most cases Peking has deployed the PLA [People's Lib-
eration Army] in defensive reaction against a perceived threat, usually
manifested by hostile movements toward sensitive border areas.
'292
Generally, in fact, "[w]hen it comes to practical action, the CPR
[People's Republic of China] has actually failed to live up to its own
militant rhetoric. ' 293 Such a discrepancy is also evident in its attitude
towards wars of national liberation.
Chinese officials have steadfastly pledged their support for na-
tional liberation struggles against colonial rule and imperialistic domi-
nation and, generally, against "imperialism, modem revisionism and
286. See 19 U.N. SCOR (527th mtg.) paras. 96-97, U.N. Doc. S/PV.527 (1950).
287. See 452 CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS 4 (1963).
288. See 12 PEKING REV., July 11, 1969, No. 28, at 6; id., Aug. 15, 1969, No. 33, at 3.
289. See 8 PEKING REV., Feb. 12, 1965, No. 7, at 6-7 (a government statement entitled:
China is Well Prepared to Assist D.R. V Against US. Aggression).
290. South China Morning Post, Mar. 27, 1979, at 5, col. 4 (quoting the Liberation Army
Daily); see also 34 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1979) at 100, U.N. Doc. S/13137 (1979)
(letter dated March 5, 1979, from the Representative of China to the Secretary General);
China 'Forced to Fire on Viets', South China Morning Post, Apr. 17, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
291. Cohen, supra note 282, at 377.
292. Whiting, The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China, 402
ANNALS 55, 57 (1972). See generally J. HsIUNG, supra note 279; S. KIM, supra note 273.
293. J. HSiUNG, supra note 279, at 288.
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reactionary regimes. ' ' 294 They have on many occasions, whether ex-
plicitly or implicitly, endorsed revolution in specific countries and
have sometimes endorsed particular revolutionary organizations.
295
Yet, the Chinese concept of support has been rather limited and ex-
pressed largely in moral, ideological and psychological terms. Indeed,
as pointed out by one observer, none of China's actual uses of force
across her national boundaries since 1949 has fallen within the cate-
gory of support for wars of national liberation.
296
Nonetheless, it is possible to argue that China's passive attitude
in this respect stems from factors such as limited resources and a pol-
icy of self-reliance. As noted by Cohen, "China is a poor, vast, devel-
oping country that is beset by the political, economic, social, and
administrative problems confronting all developing countries and thus
has limited resources to allocate to foreign liberation struggles.
'297
Equally effective here has been Mao's doctrine recognizing that
"[rievolution or people's war in any country is the business of the
masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their
own efforts; there is no other way."' 298 China's role is consequently
confined to providing a model for the revolutionary forces of the
world, some aid, and verbal encouragement; not to facilitating a
revolution for others or engaging in fighting on their behalf.
It is, thus, conceivable that had it not been for the above con-
straints, the Chinese would have pursued a more active policy of sup-
port vis-d-vis national liberation movements and would have perceived
no inherent contradiction between such a policy and the Five Princi-
ples of Coexistence to which they purport to adhere. 299 Any possible
inconsistency could, arguably, be reconciled with reference to a dy-
namic concept of peaceful coexistence which affirms the continuation
of class struggle as follows:
The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the
masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace.
Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply the renunciation of
the class struggle as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of
294. Id. at 292 (quoting Lin Piao).
295. Cohen, supra note 282, at 368-69.
296. S. Kim, supra note 273, at 72; see also Robinson, Peking's Revolutionary Strategy in
the Developing World: The Failure of Success, in 386 ANNALS 64, 64-77 (1969).
297. Cohen, supra note 282, at 369.
298. Piao, Long Live the Victory of People's War, 8 PEKING REV., Sept. 3, 1965, No. 36, at
19.
299. Respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, nonintervention, mu-
tual benefit and equality and peaceful coexistence.
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states with different social systems is a form of class struggle be-
tween socialism and capitalism . . . . It implies intensification of
the struggle of the working class, of all the Communist Parties, for
the triumph of socialist ideas. But ideological and political dis-
putes between states must not be settled through war.
3a°
An argument has also been advanced that the principles of peaceful
coexistence are simply inapplicable between Socialist and imperialist
states. It is theorized that since the latter do not respect these princi-
ples and insist on pursuing a policy of exploitation and suppression of
oppressed peoples, the Socialist states are free to, and indeed, are obli-
gated to, come to the defense of the oppressed peoples by aiding na-
tional liberation movements.30'
A more skeptical interpretation of the Chinese posture depicts
the self-serving nature of the concept of peace under the Maoist peace
strategy which obviates any need for reconciliation. Thus, according
to a Taiwanese scholar, the idea of peaceful coexistence in Maoist
thought is, in effect, only a link in a wider war policy, an instrument
to win over middle-of-the-roaders, a united front tactic, a vehicle of
domestic reconstruction, and a means to resolve crises.30 2 Support for
wars of national liberation could easily fit within such a scheme for
peaceful coexistence.
Whichever ideological polemic one chooses to subscribe to, an
examination of Chinese practice reveals a certain uneasiness and sen-
sitivity about a policy of support for both revolution and peaceful co-
existence. This uneasiness is evidenced by the tendency of the
Chinese authorities to resort to elaborate tactics in order to impose a
more defensible framework on the various activities which may be
regarded as contradicting traditionally acceptable principles of inter-
national law. 30 3 In the final analysis, however, China's primary con-
cerns are the interests of the Chinese state rather than any abstract
notions of international legal norms, and its attitudes towards the use
of force continues to be strongly influenced by its strategic goals.
300. Steiner, supra note 260, at 547. This was a formula adopted in a meeting of represent-
atives of the world Communist movement in Moscow, 1960.
301. See Cohen, supra note 282, at 371 (reference to various series of Party documents).
302. See Kuo-Ch'iang, A Study of the Peace Policies of Washington, Peiping and Moscow, 8
ISSUES & STUDIES 15, 18-19 (1972).
303. Cohen, supra note 282, at 372, 375. Cohen refers to tactics such as secrecy concern-
ing the scope and nature of the military and economic aid given, and the use of state discretion
in deciding whether and when to recognize insurgents as the legitimate government.
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D. Third World Approach
As stated above, Chinese views, because of that country's sheer
size and potential importance, merit separate consideration. The
same cannot be said of other Third World countries, since they do not
enjoy as much leverage in the international arena. The Third World
as a whole, on the other hand, is a factor to be reckoned with, and its
collective attitudes affect international norms and events. For this
reason, it is desirable to examine common elements in Third World
perceptions regarding the use of force in international relations.
Given the common heritage of their colonial experiences, their
military weakness, and their economic, cultural and technological un-
derdevelopment, it is not surprising that Third World countries tend
to be preoccupied with concepts such as national sovereignty, self-
determination, human rights, social justice, sovereign equality and
noninterference. As declared by the Representative of Madagascar in
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, "African countries
like Madagascar, which had only recently become independent, at-
tached particularly great importance to respect for the national sover-
eignty, territorial integrity and independence of States, to their
sovereign equality and to non-intervention in the domestic affairs.
' '3°4
Third World countries also lay considerable emphasis upon justice
and human dignity. Indeed, as expressed by the Sri Lankan and In-
dian delegations, respectively, the whole purpose of the emerging new
international law is to "bring about... international social justice,
' 30 5
and to "promote a world public order embodying values of human
dignity in a society dedicated to freedom and justice.
'30 6
Nonintervention is yet another concept strongly advocated by
the Third World. In particular, it has been actively championed by
Latin American countries, consequently earning the description of
"the central axis of the inter-American system.' ' 30 7 Stemming partly
from history and partly from endemic local factors, Latin American
countries have endorsed the doctrine of nonintervention since as early
as 1868 when Calvo, the Argentine jurist, formulated what has come
304. 17 U.N. GAOR C.6 (765th mtg.) para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.765 (1962).
305. 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (805th mtg.) para. 16, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.805 (1963) (quoting
delegate of Ceylon which today is known as Sri Lanka).
306. 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 65 (1963).
307. See, e.g., Dihigo, Legality of Intervention Under the Charter of the Organization of
American States, 51 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 91 (1957) (proceedings of the fifty-first annual
meeting).
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to be referred to as the Calvo Clause308 in an attempt to ensure the
politically weak Latin American Republics from the military or polit-
ical intervention by the European powers. 30 9 A later doctrine, first
enunciated by the Argentine Foreign Minister Drage in 1902, also
sought to eliminate forceful intervention by one state against another
on the ground of a default on public debts, leading the way to the
incorporation, under the pressure of Latin American participants, of a
relevant prohibition in the Hague Conference of 1907.
A prohibition against intervention, whether directly or indi-
rectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of
any state was consequently included in the Organization of American
States Charter in Boota in 1948 which further proscribed "any other
form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the
State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements. ' '310
The Organization of American States Charter is even more emphatic
in its prohibition of the use of force in that it declares the territory of a
state to be inviolable and stipulates that "it may not be the object,
even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force
taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds
whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained
either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized. ' '3" 1
The Latin American contribution to the theories of intervention
was equally decisive during the debates on the Declaration of Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among
States. The Latin American delegates and, most notably, Mexico,
embarking upon what McWhinney has described as "avant-garde
lawmaking ventures, ' 31 2 invoked an array of practices rooted in Latin
American history of legally impermissible interventions by the big
powers. Thus, the Mexican draft, 313 after reaffirming the prohibition
308. Such a clause was at the time frequently inserted in contracts between Latin Ameri-
can governments and foreign companies or persons to whom concessions or other rights were
granted under the contract with a view to depriving the latter of any rights to diplomatic
protection as aliens. Its insertion was due to the number of occasions when, on rather flimsy
pretexts, concessionaire companies or persons sought the intervention of their own govern-
ments to protect their interests without any recourse to the remedies available in local munici-
pal courts.
309. See D. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 17-20, 216-17 (1955).
310. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 18.
311. Id. at art. 20.
312. McWhinney, The "New" Countries and the "New" International Law: The United
Nations' Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 22 (1966) (emphasis in original).
313. See also the supporting address by the Mexican Representative with a useful review
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of any form of interference "against the personality of the state or
against its political, economic and cultural elements," proposed a list
of eight different categories of legally impermissible interventions.
31 4
Equally insistent on the need to guard against the undermining
of sovereignty and independent development of smaller countries was
the Ghanan Representative, who suggested that certain activities of
states abroad, namely "propaganda, espionage, infiltration, bribery,
assassination, assistance to guerrillas, preemptory diplomatic de-
mands, and so forth," directed against another state, as well as actions
aimed at "destroying its markets, violating its laws, damaging its pres-
tige and reputation, controlling its policy or subverting its govern-




The anxiety expressed by weak Third World states with regard to
possible interventions by more powerful states is often demonstrated
in the former's attitude toward the concept of force. Typical in this
respect is the response of the Ecuadorian Representative to the Re-
port of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the
Principle of Non-use of Force in International Relations, who ex-
pressed support for a text:
prohibiting all use of force or the threat thereof, not only in terms
of military might but also in any other form of direct, indirect or
covert coercion or disguised as alleged preventive action, or in
terms of economic or political pressure, the subversion of the con-
stitutional order of a country instigated from outside, intimidation
and support of terrorism, the use of mercenaries and all campaigns
of disinformation and hostile and degrading propaganda directed
against a country and its institutions.
316
Furthermore, Third World representatives were quite adamant in
subsequent debates that any proscription of the use of force in inter-
of Latin American historical practice in 18 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States (30th mtg.) at 4-13, U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/SR.30
(1964).
314. Id. Including "coercive measures of an economic or political nature" which permit,
in the areas subject to its jurisdiction, or promote or finance anywhere, the organization or
training of armed forces for purposes of incursions into other states, or the supply of arms or
war materials for aiding rebellions in another state, or the organization of subversive or terror-
ist activities against another state; make recognition of governments or the maintenance of
international relations dependent on the receipt of special advantages; impose on a state con-
cessions to foreigners of a privileged situation exceeding the rights, means of redress and safe-
guards granted under the municipal law to nationals of that state. Id.
315. Ghana, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States (29th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.I19/SR.6 (1964).
316. 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 41) para. 30, U.N. Doc. A/37/41 (1982).
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national relations should encompass "economic aggression" which
might take the form of refusal to fulfill obligations to promote devel-
opment, erection of trade barriers by wealthy countries, failure to ex-
pedite the transfer of technology, control of prices and distribution by
powerful transnational forces and promotion of instability through
currency fluctuations and imported inflation. Still other forms of the
use of force were ideological infiltration and economic or political
sabotage.
317
Indeed, even the "threat of the use of force, like the use of force
itself, as in the case of political pressure exercised by the dozens of
armed divisions stationed by imperialist States among weaker peoples
in order to prevent their self-determination, was also unaccept-
able. ' 318 By the same token, Third World states have restated their
commitment to an absolute and unconditional prohibition of the use
of force which excluded any consideration of the intention of the state
initiating the force. 31
9
Yet, the same countries which appear to be most receptive to the
need to broaden the scope of legally impermissible interventions,
thereby extending the concept of "force" and dismissing the intention
of the initiator of force as irrelevant have also been insistent on estab-
lishing a special category of exceptions with regard to legally permissi-
ble interventions when the defense of a higher right is involved. Thus,
it has been contended that the principle of nonintervention could not
be legally invoked with respect to situations of human rights viola-
tions which were likely to affect international peace and security.
320
317. 33 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle
of Non-Use of Force in International Relations (9th mtg.) para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 193/SR.9
(1978). Note also the statement by the Representative of Nepal who stated that "the conven-
tional concept of force as military force or the use of armed forces was too narrow, since acts
of subversion, the encouragement of hostile activity, the use of the mass media to launch cam-
paigns of hatred and vilification, economic pressure, the obstruction of passage and of trade
and transit routes, and other means adopted by one State against another were all expressions
of the use of force." 34 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the
Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations (24th mtg.) para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/
AC. 193/SR.24 (1979).
318. 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 41) para. 32, U.N. Doc. A/37/41 (1982).
319. See, e.g., Mexico, 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (806th mtg.) para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
SR.806 (1963); Indonesia, 18 U.N. GAOR C.6 (809th mtg.) para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/809
(1963); Ecuador, 22 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1003d mtg.) para. 53, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1003
(1967); Chile, 23 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1092d mtg.) para. 31, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1092 (1968);
Ethopia, id at paras. 49, 52.
320. See, e.g., United Arab Republic, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States (30th mtg.) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/AC. I 19/SR.30
(1964).
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Instances of particular import justifying intervention include geno-
cide,321 apartheid and racial discrimination, 322 denial of the inherent
right of people to self-determination, 323 and other colonialist
practices.
324
There is also some evidence to suggest that, according to certain
Latin American conceptions, the principle of nonintervention may
give way to use of force "against any attempt of the international
Communist movement, or any other totalitarian system to seize
power and control the government of any of the American republics
endangering the peace, solidarity and security of the Continent" given
that "democracy and human rights are essential postulates of
[the American] Continent and indefeasible principles of [its]
community."
3 25
Third World states appear, in any event, to display a certain
double standard on issues of force and nonintervention. To facilitate
the carrying out of their main external objectives, namely the elimina-
tion of colonialism and racial discrimination, they have been quite
emphatic in their call for the use of force, even if it entails clear incon-
gruity in their stated position with respect to the Charter's prohibition
concerning the regulation of force in world affairs.
326
321. See Mali, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (882d mtg.) para. 34, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.882
(1965); Pakistan, 20 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1404th mtg.) para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 1404
(1965).
322. See Ghana, 18 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion Among States (29th mtg.) para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.1 19/SR.29 (1984); Central African
Republic, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (884th mtg.) para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.884 (1965); Sene-
gal, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (889th mtg.) para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.889 (1965); United
Republic of Tanzania, 20 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1401st mtg.) para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/SR.1401
(1965); Kenya, 20 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1402d mtg.) para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/SR.1402 (1965).
323. See Ghana, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion Among States (29th mtg.) para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 1 19/SR.29 (1964); Central African
Republic, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (884th mtg.) para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.884 (1965); Af-
ghanistan, 22 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1000th mtg.) para. 47, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1000 (1967);
Liberia, 22 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1001st mtg.) para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1001 (1969).
324. See Ghana, 19 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion Among States (29th mtg.) para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 1 19/SR.29 (1964); United Republic
of Tanzania, 20 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1401st mtg.) para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.l/SR.1401 (1965);
Kenya, 20 U.N. GAOR C.A (1402d mtg.) para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.l/SR.1402 (1965).
325. Dihigo, supra note 307, at 100. But see Travis, Collective Intervention by the Organi-
zation of American States, 51 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 100, 107-08 (1957) (proceedings of the fifty-
first annual meeting), who suggests that there is no regional agreement on the desirability of
collective intervention in the event an American government is dominated by the international
Communist movement.
326. Julius Stone draws attention to a statement by the Syrian Representative who "agreed
that armed force could be used, despite Article 3(g), in self-determination struggles, even
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Doctrinally, the basic assumption underlying their stance has
been that an armed conflict in dependent territories has an interna-
tional character because it is fought between, on the one hand, the
metropolitan government (which is part of a colonial empire of extra-
neous power) and, on the other hand, the armed forces of the depen-
dent people, which is in the process of building up the structure of its
own state. Some support for this proposition was said 327 to derive
from the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations328 which stipulates that
The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has,
under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory
of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status
under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or non-
self-governing territory have exercised their right of self-determina-
tion .... 329
More crucial, however, according to Third World jurists, has been the
"recognition of self-determination as a right," the important conse-
quence of which is "to confer an international character on armed
conflicts arising from the struggle to achieve this right and against its
forcible denial.
' '330
The tendency of Third World countries to internationalize inter-
nal wars has received its ultimate expression in the 1974-1977 Diplo-
matic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
which adopted the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 33 1 categorizing, in ef-
fect, the struggle of peoples against colonial, alien and racist regimes
as international conflicts.
Arguments in this context have generally been based on a pur-
ported right of self-defense against colonial domination which, as
though he would have wanted Article 2 to provide that use of armed force was 'automatically...
aggression, not prima facie evidence of aggression.' " J. STONE, supra note 119, at 82 (empha-
sis in original) (footnote omitted). Stone provides additional illustrations of such internal con-
tradictions in the statements of the Representatives of Uganda, Sudan and Ghana. Id.
327. See Abi-Saab, Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War, 3 ANNALS INT'L
STUD. 93, 100 (1972).
328. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 124, U.N. Doc. A/8 (1970).
329. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, reprinted
in BASic DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1. Brownlie 2d ed. 1972).
330. Abi-Saab, supra note 327, at 102.
331. Reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391-1441 (1977).
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pointed out by Dugard, appeared in two guises, namely, as an action
in self-defense against continuing aggression and pursuant to a right
of self-determination.
332
A proposal in terms of the first guise was submitted by Ghana,
India and Yugoslavia during the meeting of the Special Committee on
Friendly Relations in Mexico City in 1965. A similar proposition was
later raised in the debates of the Committee on the Question of Defin-
ing Aggression, 333 and gained the support of several Afro-Asian Rep-
resentatives as well as of the Socialist states.33
4
To prevent an overly broad interpretation of article 51 of the
Charter, certain countries, however, hastened to emphasize that the
maintenance of a colonial administration itself constituted an armed
attack.335 Yet other moderate Third World states, adhering to the
stricto sensu school in relation to article 5 1, supported a "limited right
of rebellion," namely, permitting colonial people the right to self-
determination.
336
It is, however, the second guise of the argument based on a right
of self-defense which has been forcefully advocated by Afro-Asian
countries.337 Indeed, a joint proposal was put forward by thirteen
332. See Dugard, The Organisation ofAfrican Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry into the
Plea ofSelf-Defence as a Justification for the Use ofForce in the Eradication of Colonialism, 16
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 157 (1967).
333. The statement of the Representative of Guinea provides a categorical formulation of
such a claim:
The colonial system was the most flagrant act of aggression which could be perpe-
trated; thus Africa, throughout much of its territory, was at present suffering acts of
undoubted aggression for which the colonialist Powers were responsible. All other
forms of colonisation - neo-colonialism, imperialism or economic colonialism - fell
within that category of direct aggression. The same could be said of the policy of
apartheid applied in South Africa - a most monstrous form of aggression - as also
of the policy of the white minority Government of Southern Rhodesia with respect to
the inhabitants of Zimbabwe.
Id. at 169 (emphasis in original).
334. Afghanistan, 22 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1000th mtg.) para. 47, U.N. Doe. A/C.6/SR. 1000
(1967); Cuba, 23 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1091st mtg.) para. 41, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1091 (1968);
Liberia, id. at para. 33; UAR, id. at para. 16; Madagascar, 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1474th mtg.)
para. 39, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1474 (1974).
335. See, e.g., Egypt, 24 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1163d mtg.) para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
SR. 1163 (1969); Togo, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (208th mtg.) para. 19, U.N. Do. A/C.6/SR.208
(1970).
336. See Gorelick, supra note 139, at 77.
337. Latin American states, however, chose a line of reasoning based on the proposition
that colonial rule was illegal and hence its destruction would not constitute a disruption of the
territorial integrity of a state. See Gorelick, supra note 139, at 82. Dugard suggests that an
argument in the first "guise" is in fact unsuitable in the African context as "none of the present
independent African States can claim to be historically a victim of colonial 'continuing aggres-
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Third World countries, 3 8 and incorporated into the Report of the
1966 Special Committee on Friendly Relations, to the effect that the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples encom-
passes "rights to eliminate, and to self-defense against, colonial domi-
nation - an essential element or a corollary of the principle of self-
determination .... This inclusion of rights in the principle, is neces-
sary and in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on
Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and of
General Assembly Resolution 2105 (XX) of 20/12/65. ' '33
9
A similar proposition was made ten years later, at the Interna-
tional Conference on Namibia and Human Rights, as a basis for a
claim by the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) that
its war of national liberation was legally justified as an action in self-
defense aimed at the assertion of the right of self-determination. 340
In SWAPO's view, self-determination was "a cardinal principle
of international law" and, arguably, "part of thejus cogens of interna-
tional law."' 34' It was a legal duty imposed on states, thus creating a
corresponding "right which accrues in favour of a people." By exten-
sion, if such a right is "forcibly denied them then, under article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, they have a right to defend them-
selves and their territory; the more so, against an illegal occupier. A
people's liberation war can be clearly identified as defensive action
within the meaning of the Charter. ' 342 It also followed that other
states had, under international law, "the right to provide assistance,
military and otherwise, to the Namibian people in their struggle for
self-determination."
343
This argument also drew support from a judge's dictum in the
Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
sion' in the African dependent territories." Furthermore, a Goa-type argument is inapplicable
since "in the case of the dependent African territories independence is envisaged and not an-
nexation by another State as in the case of Goa." Dugard, supra note 332, at 170. According
to Gorelick, the argument that colonialism represents permanent aggression was not used
much by anticolonial states because of the difficulty involved in "providing that military con-
quest was a delicta juris gentium during a time when this method of territorial acquisition was
not only legally respectable, but even morally compelling." Gorelick, supra note 139, at 80.
338. The thirteen countries were Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, Dahomey, Ghana, India,
Kenya, Lebanon, Madagascar, Nigeria, Syria, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.
339. 21 U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item 87) para. 497, U.N. Doc. A/6230 (1966).
340. Dugard, SWAPO: The Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, 93 SOUTH AFRICAN L.J.
144 (1976).
341. Id. (emphasis in original).
342. Id. at 144-45.
343. Id. at 145.
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Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Southwest Africa) Notwithstand-
ing Security Council Resolution 276 in 1970 which provided that "[i]n
law, the legitimacy of the Namibia peoples' struggle cannot be in any
doubt, for it follows from the right of self-defense, inherent in human
nature, which is confirmed by Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter."
344
Third World states seem to be united on the issue of the legiti-
macy of the use of force by national liberation movements. There is
less agreement, however, on the issue of whether self-determination
extends to people beyond those under colonial domination, and in
particular, of whether it extends to neocolonial struggles, like those
waged by the Iranian people against the Shah. It appears that some
Third World elites are opposed to its extension, presumably because it
would undermine their delicate position and national sovereignty. 345
At the same time, Third World states have also considered the
use of force in contexts other than anticolonialism and antiracism.
Falk has noted that "[t]he artificiality of inherited boundaries is an
almost endless occasion for interstate violence in Asia and Africa.
'346
Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic [Egypt], for in-
stance, have been accused, at various times, of resorting to force to
achieve national expansion. 347 On the other hand, there have also
been instances of coercive actions for purportedly more humanitarian
purposes, including India's invasion of Goa in 1961,348 the Bangla-
desh crisis in 197 1349 and the intervention by Tanzania in Uganda in
1979.350
The point arising out of the preceding analysis is that, not unlike
other states, certain priorities in the foreign policies of Third World
governments are accorded precedence over the total renunciation of
nondefensive force. Clearly, the objectives of the eradication of
colonialism and the elimination of racial discrimination prevail in a
344. Dugard, International Terrorism and the Just War, 12 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 21, 24
(1977).
345. See Schwenninger, supra note 176, at 429.
346. Falk, The New States and International Legal Order, 118 RECUEIL DEs COURS 1, 51
(1966).
347. Id. at 52.
348. See Wright, The Goa Incident, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 617 (1962).
349. See Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention, 11 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 45 (1981).
350. See Burrows, Tanzania's Intervention in Uganda: Some Legal Aspects, 35 WORLD
TODAY 306 (1979); Chatterjee, Some Legal Problems of Support Role in International Law:
Tanzania and Uganda, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 755 (1981).
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conflict with the allegiance of Third World states to the prohibition
against the use of force in international relations or the principle of
nonintervention.
E. Religious Influences
Political ideologies and state interests are not the only factors
which impinge on perceptions of whether war is ever justifiable. An-
other important source of influence shaping views on the subject is
religious doctrine, as expressed by two of the world's major religions
- Islam and Christianity. In fact, following the resurgence of reli-
gious involvement in the political arena, Islamic and Christian doc-
trines may have acquired greater significance in this respect than at
any time since the end of the Second World War. Both militant Mos-
lems and dedicated Christians are increasingly vocal in endeavouring
to come to terms with the phenomenon of war and its ramifications.
However, it is apparent that, as in the case of the various ideolo-
gies and state interests, religions, too, contain no unequivocal answer
to the dilemmas of war. Islam, in particular, is marked by a dichot-
omy between ideal and reality. The idea of peace is considered to be
very central to Islam,351 but Islamic law enjoins Moslems to maintain
a state of permanent belligerence with all nonbelievers, collectively
encompassed in the dar al-harb, the domain of war.
352
In other words, theoretically at least, the dar al-Islam is always
at war with the dar al-harb, until, by conquest, the latter is turned
into the abode of Islam. The Moslems are, therefore, under a legal
obligation to reduce non-Islamic communities to Islamic rule in order
to achieve Islam's ultimate objective, namely the enforcement of
God's law (the Shari'a) over the entire world. 353 The instrument by
which the Islamic state is to carry out that objective is called thejihad
(popularly known as "holy war") 35 4 and is always just, if waged
351. See Hassan, The Idea of Peace in the Hierarchy of Islamic Values, 4 INT'L INST. FOR
PEACE, PEACE & THE SOC. Sci. 28-29 (1980).
352. Under the traditional political law of Islam (the siyar) the world is divided into the
domain of the Muslims or the faithful, known as dar al-Islam and all other territories, the
domain of the infidels, known as dar al-harb, which literally means the domain of war. See M.
KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 53, 170-71 (1955).
353. See Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law of Nations, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 358 (1956).
354. It has been maintained that the application of the terrnjihad in the sense of "holy" or
"religious war" is far from being exact. Thefihad obligation, i.e., fighting in the path of God
may be exercised by means other than the sword, although the "holy war" aspect is one of its
most important elements. See Nawaz, The Doctrine of Jihad in Islamic Legal Theory and
Practice, 8 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L AFF. 32 (1959).
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against the infidels and the enemies of the faith.
Bozeman has, therefore, legitimately concluded that from a doc-
trinal point of view:
[W]ar is an integral part of the Islamic legal system; for in accord-
ance with the doctrines of the jihad, which is recognized as "the
peak of religion," the Islamic commonwealth must be expanding
relentlessly, like a caravan continuously on the move, until it be-
comes coterminous with humanity, at which time war will have
been transposed into universal peace.
355
The peace-war contradiction embedded in Islam has been ex-
plained, at the theoretical level, in terms of the inevitable interrela-
tionship existing between the two phenomena.3 56 Specifically, it has
been argued that the Koran, the Muslim scripture, does not under-
stand peace to be a passive state of affairs, a mere absence of war.
Thus, for instance, the kind of peace that emerges as a by-product of
cold war is "not only unholy but unreal because it does not guarantee
the existence of those conditions required by the actualization of
human potentialities and the fulfillment of the total human being.
' 357
To be more explicit, the Islamic obligation of jihad is aimed at the
elimination of inequities, inequalities and injustices which pervade the
personal and collective lives of people in order for a real peace to
prevail in accordance with the prophet Mohammed's saying that
"swords are the key to paradise. ' 358
Moslem apologists also quote the Koran in an attempt to dispel
"distortions about Islam," pointing out that although realistic in its
approach (accepting war as a fact of life as long as there exists in the
world injustice, oppression, capricious ambitions and arbitrary
claims), Islam never tolerates aggression from its own side or any
other side, and it does not entertain aggressive wars or the initiation
of aggressive wars. This is because Moslems are commanded by God
not to begin hostilities, embark on any act of aggression, or violate
any right of others. 35 9 Indeed, in the context of reality, as shaped by
355. Bozeman, War and the Clash of Ideas, 20 ORBis 61, 81-82 (1946).
356. See Hassan, supra note 351, at 29. A similar argument is often put forward by Arab
countries with regard to peace with Israel. It is contended that peace can be established only
after the wrong is rectified and justice is done (in this case justice will be done when the rights
of the Palestinian people are restored and Israel ceases to exist). That justice is a supreme
value is repeatedly emphasized by Arab governments in various forms and in official resolu-
tions. See Y. HARKABI, ARAB ATTITUDES TO ISRAEL 106-07 (1972).
357. Hassan, supra note 351, at 29.
358. Id.
359. See H. ABDALATI, ISLAM IN Focus 142 (1977). For a detailed discussion concerning
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Moslem governments, jihad has often been suppressed into a state of
dormant war, 36° many practical modifications have been introduced
into the law regulating it.361
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that although contemporary
Moslem national ideologists tend to rationalize their military postures
in secular terms, they often reflect more fundamental religious convic-
tions. This is particularly evident in pronouncements directed at in-
ternal audiences, as compared to those aimed at the international
community. Thus, the struggle against Israel is often described to the
people as a ihad, with frequent allusions to the virtues of holy war
and religous promises to its fighters.
362
Whatever compromises have been made, however, it is generally
believed in the Moslem world that war is permissible, and indeed a
sacred duty, when it is fought for just causes. 363 These just causes
have been classified into the following categories: (1) suspended, the
renewal of a prior just war; that is, ajihad which has, for some reason,
been suspended; (2) defensive, aimed at repelling enemy attacks;
(3) sympathetic, providing assistance to other Moslems in matters of
religion; (4) punitive, against hypocrisy, apostasy, rebellion or the
breaking of a covenant by the other party; (5) idealistic, that is, the
expansion of Islam and making the Word of God supreme over the
world. 36
4
In the context of the Middle East conflict, where Arab national-
ism and Islamic aspiratons intertwine, another cause features promi-
nently, presumably under the fourth category, namely, the recovery of
occupied lands. The justifiability of such a cause was put forward, for
example, by former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1968
when he asserted that "there is a fundamental obligation, a matter of
life and death; the liberation of land, step by step, if need be, even if
every step costs a victim. This must be clear: war - to achieve jus-
tice - is legal. ' ' 365 A similar statement was made by Nasser's succes-
"misconceptions about aggressive jihad," see M. AL-GHUNAYMI, THE MUSLIM CONCEPTION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WESTERN APPROACH 165-80 (1968).
360. According to Khadduri, this is analogous to a state of nonrecognition in international
law. See Khadduri, supra note 353, at 360.
361. Id. at 370-72.
362. See ISLAM, FROM THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD TO THE CAPTURE OF CONSTANTI-
NOPLE 211 (B. Lewis trans. 1976).
363. See M. KHAN, ISLAM, ITS MEANING FOR MODERN MAN 178 (1962).
364. See A. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 10-11 (1979).
365. INFORMATION DIVISION, MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BACKWARD TO WAR,
FORWARD TO PEACE 10 (1969).
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sor, Anware el-Sadat, who declared in an interview broadcast in 1973
that "[w]hat has been taken by force can be regained only by force
.... There is no solution for the problem without a battle. ' 366 Ac-
cording to Sadat, article 51 encompasses this sacred duty to liberate
occupied territories and restore just rights.367 Such an argument has
been frequently made by other Arab states as well. Thus, in the de-
bates of the General Assembly First Committee on a proposed Treaty
on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations in 1976, Iraq,
Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Republic and Qatar insisted that the right
to self-defense included the right to employ force for the recovery of
territories occupied by force.3
68
Supporters of such a position rely on a rather broad reading of
the U.N. Charter provision on self-defense "which considers a contin-
ued forcible occupation following an armed intervention a prolonged
'armed attack' under Article 51 of the Charter. ' 369 Others maintain
that Israel's retention of the territories constitutes a continued aggres-
sion 370 or a permanent aggression. 3
71
It should be added that, while this type of argument may stem
generally from an ideological rejection of what is conceived of as
colonialism and imperialism, the Islamic factor appears to underlie
the basic hostility towards the Jewish state. 372 This serves to demon-
strate that attitudes towards war are not only conditioned by forces
which have their origin in interstate relations but also reflect residual
religious influences. Such influences also manifest themselves in other
parts of the world in which Christianity is the dominant religion.
Christian leaders have shown a growing tendency to reassert their au-
thority in matters pertaining to the conduct of foreign affairs and have
aimed increasingly at guiding public opinion and making a tangible
impact on policy choices. 373
366. See 10 UN MONTHLY CHRON. 41 (Nov. 1973).
367. U.N. GAOR (2388th plen. mtg.) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2388 (1975).
368. See 30 U.N.Y.B. 105, 107 (1976); see also 27 U.N. GAOR (2082d plen. mtg.) para. 7,
U.N. Doc. A/PV.2082 (1972).
369. Shihata, Destination Embargo ofArab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law, 68
AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 607-08 & n.86 (1974).
370. See H. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES 281
(1975).
371. Thierry, L'accord Isralo-gyptien du 4 Septembre 1975 et les Nouvelles Responsabilits
des Etats-Unis et des Nations Unies au Moyen-Orient, 1975 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 45, 50 n.10.
372. Islamic motifs are frequently used to express Arab attachment to Palestine. See Y.
HARKABI, supra note 356, at 134-37.
373. In the words of the United States bishops, "We believe religious leaders have a task in
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Christians, however, do not speak in one voice. Three recurring
Christian attitudes toward war and peace have been identified, namely
pacifism, the just war and the crusade. 374 While the latter ethical ori-
entation is not explicitly considered within contemporary Christian
teaching, it expresses itself more indirectly. Thus, according to Pot-
ter, "[t]he currently fashionable flirtation of Protestants with theories
that portray violent revolution as a justifiable recourse for the urban
ghetto dweller or the oppressed of the underdeveloped nations reflects
the recrudescence of crusading sentiment in a new guise. ' 375 It is also
arguable that:
[M]any of the statements made by those who support the cause of
revolution as it feeds and stokes "war of liberation" bear the marks
of a crusade mentality: absolute certainty in the justice of the
cause; the division of contending forces into good and evil; the re-
jection of a neutral position; the willingness to take great risks and
to "make the final sacrifice;" an unwillingness to make com-
promises. In brief, the transformation of political action into a reli-
gious cause and holy war.
3 7 6
At the same time, the pacifist perspective in the Christian tradi-
tion has been given added legitimacy as a method for evaluating mod-
em warfare. Especially vociferous in denouncing war have been the
ecumenical Churches and their protestant leaders. 377 Advocates of
concert with public officials, analysts, private organizations and the media to set the limits
beyond which our military policy should not move in word or action." THE CHICAGO CATH-
OLIC, Nov., 1982, at 7A (Special supplement discussing the second draft of a proposed pastoral
letter on War, Armaments and Peace issued by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops)
[hereinafter Pastoral Letter].
374. Bainton outlines the development of the three theories as follows: "The early Church
was pacifist to the time of Constantine. Then, partly as a result of the close association of
Church and state under this emperor and partly by reason of the threat of barbarian invasions,
Christians in the fourth and fifth centuries took over from the classical world the doctrine of
the just war, whose object should be to vindicate justice and restore peace .... The crusade
arose in the high Middle Ages, a holy war fought under the auspices of the Church or of some
inspired religious leader, not on behalf of justice conceived in terms of life and property, but on
behalf of an ideal, the Christian faith." R. BAINTON, supra note 2, at 14.
375. R. POTTER, WAR AND MORAL DISCOURSE 52 (1969).
376. Finn, Pacifism and Justifiable War, in WAR OR PEACE? THE SEARCH FOR NEW
ANSWERS 3, 12 (T. Shannon ed. 1980).
377. Although their views are not necessarily shared by a great number of their constitu-
encies, who feel closer to opinions such as those of the Vatican. Thus, for example, the Evan-
gelical Church in Germany holds to the position supported by international law that defense,
even including reaction against an aggressive use of force already carried out, is a sufficient
moral justification for war. For other similar statements of Protestant bodies and for a discus-
sion on general religious attitudes, see Teunissen, The Debate in the Churches on War, Peace
and Disarmament, 36 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 435, 460-68 (1983). Among Protestant individu-
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the Pacifist option draw on texts such as the encyclical of Pope John
XXIII, Pacem in Terris (1963), the Vatican II's Gaudium et Spes
(1965) and a series of statements by Pope Paul VI during his pontifi-
cate (1963-1978). 78 In particular, modern Christian pacifists have
found support in a widely discussed verse in Pacem in Terris in which
Pope John XXIII asserted: "Therefore in this age of ours, which
prides itself on its atomic power, it is irrational to think that war is a
proper way to obtain justice for violated rights. ' 379 Christian pacifists
also rely on the Second Vatican Council's statement on war: "It is
our clear duty, then, to work for the time when all war can be com-
pletely outlawed by international consent" 380 as well as on the Coun-
cil's endorsement of a position of conscientious objection to all war as
a valid Christian stance. 38' Finally, reference is also made to Pope
Paul's address before the United Nations General Assembly on Octo-
ber 4, 1965, in which he declared:
There is no need for long speeches to proclaim the supreme finality
of this Institution [war]. Suffice it to recall that the blood of mil-
lions of men, that countless and unheard-of sufferings, that useless
massacres and fearful ruins have sealed the pact uniting you with a
vow which must change the future history of the world: never
again war, war never again.
382
The above pronouncements have, however, been subject to di-
verse readings and interpretations, 38 3 leading commentators to the
conclusion that, while there is a clear pacifist strain in Catholicism
and whereas a certain change in that direction in the Catholic evalua-
tion of modern war is evident, "compared to the long-developed and
predominant just war position, the tradition of Catholic pacifism,
als, most notable is Paul Ramsey whose views are more consistent with catholic thought than
with pacifism of the liberal protestant variety. See generally P. RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR:
FORCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); P. RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE:
How SHALL MODERN WAR BE CONDUCTED JUSTLY? (1961).
378. Reprinted in J. GREMILLION, THE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE: CATHOLIC SO-
CIAL TEACHING SINCE POPE JOHN (1976).
379. A. FLANNERY, VATICAN II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST-CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS
(1975).
380. See THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 295 (W. Abbott ed. 1966).
381. See Declaration on Conscientious Objection and Selective Conscientious Objection, re-
printed in IN THE NAME OF PEACE: COLLECTIVE STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. CATHOLIC
BISHOPS ON WAR AND PEACE 1919-1980 53-57 (1983) [hereinafter IN THE NAME OF PEACE].
382. OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UNITED NATIONS, NEVER WAR AGAIN 37
(1965).
383. See Johnson, Toward Reconstructing the Jus ad Bellum, 57 MONIST 461, 481-85
(1973).
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however strong theologically, is historically thin and insubstan-
tial." 38 4 The total content of recent Catholic teaching does not sup-
port a judgment that the Church has moved from a just war ethic to a
pacifist position.
38 5
By the same token, "today in the Catholic community, when an
issue of peace or war is addressed, the non-violent tradition must be
part of the discussion. ' ' 3s6 In other words, it should be recognized
that there are two moral responses offered to the Catholic conscience
confronted by the moral dilemma of war: the just war ethic and
Christian pacifism.
At the same time, it is apparent that the view that war is justifi-
able under certain conditions has been and remains the dominant tra-
dition in the Church. The development of contemporary Catholic
doctrine has not, in spite of strong statements against war, been in the
direction of total rejection of war in this era, but rather along lines
taken in the just war tradition.
Indeed, a recurring theme in the various Catholic teachings is the
right of states to legitimate defense or the recognition of "the neces-
sity for recourse to armed defense and to collective security action in
the absence of a competent authority on the international level and
once peaceful means have been exhausted. ' 38 7 By contrast, "wars of
aggression" or "wars fought without limitation" are "condemned
without qualification," thus bringing to bear on policy choices the just
war ethical calculus used to determine when recourse to arms is
"legitimate."
Such a calculus has been employed by the Roman Catholic
Church with respect to specific armed interventions. For example, in
his Christmas message after the events in Hungary in 1956, Pope Pius
XII declared:
There is no further room for doubt about the purposes and the
384. Finn, supra note 376, at 8.
385. Hehir, The Just- War Ethic and Catholic Theology: Dynamics of Change and Con-
tinuity, in IN THE NAME OF PEACE, supra note 381, at 15, 22.
386. Pastoral Letter, supra note 373, at 5A.
387. Human Life in Our Day, reprinted in IN THE NAME OF PEACE supra note 381, at 33,
35. The Church has traditionally recognized that under stringent conditions, engaging in war
can be a form of legitimate defense. Id. The bishops reiterated this view in The Gospel of
Peace and the Danger of War, reprinted in IN THE NAME OF PEACE, supra note 381, at 71,
(quoting PACEM IN TERRIS and GAUDIUM ET SPES) to "affirm, as Catholic teaching tradition-
ally has acknowledged, that some use of force in defense of the common good are legitimate."
Id. For a similar statement see Salt II A Statement of Support, reprinted in IN THE NAME OF
PEACE, supra note 381, at 76.
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methods that lie behind tanks when they crash resoundingly across
frontiers .... When all the possible states of negotiation and medi-
ation are bypassed, and when the threat is made to use atomic
arms to obtain concrete demands, whether these are justified or
not, it becomes clear that, in present circumstances, there may
come into existence in a nation a situation in which all hope of
averting war becomes vain. In this situation a war of efficacious
self-defense against unjust attacks, which is undertaken with hope
of success, cannot be considered illicit.
388
Similarly, in applying the principles underlying the just war doctrine,
United States bishops in a statement on "Peace and Vietnam" (1966)
were able to conclude that "it is reasonable to argue that our presence
in Vietnam is justified"3 89 and that citizens who took part in this justi-
fied war against aggression were in fact "making a genuine contribu-
tion to the establishment of peace."
' 390
The just war attitude adopted by the Church is further supported
by moral theologians and students of ethics who contend that the just
war theory provides a framework within which the two polar claims
of not harming and the obligation of protecting the innocent may be
acknowledged through compromise. 391 As elaborated by Potter, the
doctrine is grounded in a strong presumption against the use of vio-
lence. This presumption is established for the Christian by the nonre-
sistant example of Jesus and for the rational non-Christian by prudent
concern for order and mutual security, which may be overcome only
by the necessity of vindicating justice and protecting the innocent
against unjust aggressors. Hence, force must always be restrained,
because its only legitimate function is to restrain. 392 Murray also em-
phasizes that while striving to abolish war, limit its evils, and human-
ize its conduct, the contemporary restatement of the theory of just
war reaffirms the values that both justify war and demand its limita-
tion. 393 Furthermore, far from being a contradiction of the basic
Christian desire for peace, it is the strongest affirmation of this will for
"there is no peace without justice, law and order" and "law and order
have need at times of the powerful arm of force." Indeed, "the con-
cept of peace itself requires that peace be defended against
388. J. MURRAY, MORALITY AND MODERN WAR 11 (1959).
389. IN THE NAME OF PEACE, supra note 381, at 25, 27-28.
390. Id. at 27.
391. See R. POTTER, supra note 375, at 61.
392. Id.
393. See Murray, Remarks on the Moral Problem of War, 20 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 40,
56-57 (1959).
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violation. ,394
F The Nuclear Factor
This assumption has been challenged on the grounds that the de-
velopment of nuclear weapons has confounded the relationship be-
tween aims, methods and consequences. Arguments have been made
that "[n]uclear war condemns itself by the fact that it would not be
fought for any rational, positive war aim. The attacker, and there-
upon presumably the attacked, would aim exclusively at each other's
physical destruction. ' 395 The nature of the new weaponry also makes
any correspondence between goals and means obsolete,396 and, its in-
herently indiscriminate effects exclude respect for the traditional dis-
tinction between combatants and noncombatants. 397 It is imperative,
therefore, to pose the question whether the availability of nuclear
weapons has tangibly affected perceptions about the justifiability of
war in the contemporary era.
The nuclear debate seems to have produced a variety of re-
sponses: to the pacifists in general, the development of nuclear tech-
nology, which provides policy-makers with the means of widespread
destruction, is taken as further confirmation and reinforcement of
their belief in the utter irrationality and immorality of the whole idea
of war. 398 The onset of nuclear weapons has, however, created a par-
ticular type of pacifism, namely nuclear pacifism. This position, ac-
cording to Hehir, is "grounded in just war premises (some uses of war
are legitimate) but terminates in a pacifist conclusion (nuclear weap-
ons cannot be used). ' 399 In fact, it is by applying the just war criteria
of discrimination and proportionality that contemporary nuclear
strategies are condemned. It is evident that, once adopted, nuclear
warfare cannot be controlled, any distinction between civilians and
soldiers cannot be made, and a sense of proportion cannot be
maintained.
The Catholic bishops of the United States appear to have
adopted this position in their draft Pastoral Letter of War, Arma-
394. J. MURRAY, supra note 388, at 9.
395. See Fried, First Use of Nuclear Weapons. Existing Prohibitions in International Law,
12 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 21-22 (1981).
396. J. BENNETr, FOREIGN POLICY IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 104-05 (1966).
397. See Mahoney, The Difficulties of Defining a 'Just War' in the Nuclear Age, The Times
(London), Feb. 21, 1969, at 14, col.2.
398. See J. LIDER, supra note 216, at 142 n.18.
399. Id. at 103.
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ments and Peace. They, thus, condemned "counter-population war-
fare" because of the "disproportionate damage which would be done
to human life," and renounced the initiation of nuclear war since the
"danger of escalation is so great that it is an unacceptable moral
risk."4°°
At the same time, there are scholars who reassert a just war doc-
trine without, however, arriving at a pacifist position with respect to
nuclear weapons.4' They contend that even if a war is very destruc-
tive, it may be just if its aims are of sufficient importance and value.
They also state that, while all possible means should be taken to avoid
the evils of war, if some vital purpose cannot be attained without us-
ing nuclear weapons, it would not be immoral to do so. Furthermore,
it is argued that the total amount of devastation and suffering may
actually be reduced if what would otherwise be a prolonged war is
brought to a quick termination by an act of great violence.4
2
Yet, other analysts have attempted to modify the traditional just
war doctrine to take account of the strategies of nuclear war. Their
reasoning does not lead them to advocate an absolute ban on nuclear
weaponry though it does impose some rather strict moral ceilings on
their use. Ramsey, for instance, maintains that nuclear war can be, in
some circumstances, a moral possibility. He has identified a policy
option of "counterforce nuclear targeting," in contrast to large-scale
"countercity war," as allowing the use of nuclear weapons under such
circumstances but only as the "upper limit. ' ' 403 In fact, even such
targets are only conditionally permissible, since a proportionality rule
would have to be applied in each case.
The concept of limited war also characterizes attitudes of polit-
ical realists in the nuclear age. Their basic assumptions, formulated
in the post World War II period, have remained unchanged: war is a
political act and, as such, not subject to moral assessment; it is
subordinated to interpretations of state interests and political pur-
poses and may be waged in order to maintain the security of the na-
tion and protect its way of life.4°4 Consequently, "[f]lexible use of
400. Id. at 6A-7A.
401. Id. at 141-42.
402. Nye, Reagan, the Bishops and the Bombs, The Boston Globe, Jan. 31, 1983, at 2.
403. Ramsey, The Case for Making "Just War"Possible, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE
CONFLICT OF CONSCIENCE 143 (J. Bennett, ed. 1962). "Counterforce nuclear targeting" refers
to nuclear attacks on the military targets of the adversary including some economic and indus-
trial targets which are deemed "war supporting." Id.
404. See M. HOWARD, STUDIES IN WAR AND PEACE 203 (1970).
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nuclear power, if it would serve a rational policy, would be moral. ' '405
By the same token, in terms of the effectiveness of nuclear weap-
ons (since "to succeed in achieving some political goal presupposes
that the conduct of battle can be kept under rational control"), 4°6 a
certain measure of limitation is called for. The same conclusion is
also reached when the question of public support is considered.
Given the strong popular feelings against nuclear weapons, political
leaders concerned about retaining political power would tend to re-
frain from resorting to such weapons. Thus, while accepting the justi-
fiability of wars following a rational analysis, utilitarian consideration
pertaining to nuclear strategies have led realists to accept the need for
restraint and to support "limited wars." 4 7
In contrast, however, to the strong American support of the con-
cept of limited wars, 408 Soviet military writers have condemned all
limited wars primarily because they run the risk of escalating into
nuclear world wars. Moreover, they recognize that it would be "ex-
tremely difficult to explain to one's soldiers ... that a war can be both
just and limited at the same time. People do not willingly sacrifice
their lives or the lives of their fellows for a cause which is of limited
significance."4° 9
Nonetheless, pragmatic considerations have inspired agreements
such as the US-USSR Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War,
signed in Washington on June 22, 1973. In order to avoid the danger
of a nuclear war and "[c]onscious that nuclear war would have devas-
tating consequences for mankind" 4 10 the parties agreed "to proceed
from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of
force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and
405. Schratz, Clausewitz, Cuba and Command, 8 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 25, 30 (1964).
406. J. LIDER, supra note 216, at 142.
407. See I. CLARK, LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR: POLITICAL THEORY AND WAR CONVEN-
TIONS 1 (1982).
408. Proponents of limited wars include scholars such as Henry A. Kissinger [NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1957)], Robert Endicott Osgood [LIMITED WARS: THE
CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY (1957); LIMITED WAR REVISITED (1979)] and Ber-
nard Broodie [STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE (1959); WAR AND POLITICS (1972)], who
draw on the realist orientation in international relations formulated by theorists such as Hans
A. Morgenthau [POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1948)] and Kenneth W. Thompson [POLITICAL
REALISM AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD POLITICS (1960)].
409. Jones, Just Wars and Limited Wars.- Restraints on the Use of the Soviet Armed Forces,
28 WORLD POL. 44, 59 (1975).
410. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, preamble, 24 U.S.T. 1478, 1479,
T.I.A.S. No. 7654.
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against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger inter-
national peace and security."'41' The latter qualification may, how-
ever, suggest that the parties are not expected to refrain from the
threat or use of force in circumstances which would not endanger in-
ternational peace and security. This and other similar formulations
are relied upon by Roling in support of the view that in the nuclear
era there is a "tendency to lose sight of the distincition betweenjus ad
bellum andjus in bello. ' 412 Indeed, it appears that one of the effects
of the nuclear dilemma has been the shifting of emphasis from the
question of whether war is ever justifiable to how it can be fought in a
justifiable way. As pointed out by Ramsey, it is not the justice or
injustice of particular regimes in conflict that determines for the "or-
dinary men" their responsibility in war since they cannot know about
these things "clearly and certainly." They can, however, know "more
clearly and certainly the moral limits pertaining to the armed action a
man or a nation is about to engage in."
'413
IV. CONCLUDING NOTE
The preceding survey of the various national, ideological and
religious perspectives on the justifiability of war gives rise to a number
of general propositions. First, it is evident that notwithstanding the
Charter's proscription of the use of force in international relations
and other United Nations initiatives to outlaw war, states still con-
sider recourse to force justifiable under certain circumstances. In-
deed, regardless of their ideological inclinations and respective
national policies, the world's powers share this attitude. These pow-
ers differ only with respect to the interests to be protected and the
goals to be achieved through the use of force.
Second, it is apparent that in the hierarchy of world values the
avoidance of armed conflict is of great importance without, however,
assuming an absolute nature. Protection of human rights, for exam-
ple, could be said to be as important a value, prompting scholars such
as O'Brien to conclude that non-use of force or nonintervention is:
not an unchallengeable first rule of enlightened international be-
havior, and that unilateral intervention on behalf of justice and
411. Id. at art. 2.
412. See Roling, Aspects of the Ban on Force, 24 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 242, 245
(1977).
413. P. RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE: How SHALL MODERN WAR
BE CONDUCTED JUSTLY? 32 (1961).
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human rights is at least a conceivable moral option in a world
where massive violations of human rights exist and where expecta-
tions for community action to prevent, repress, or punish them is
negligible.
4 14
Even those who advocate minimum world public order as the primary
goal of the present international legal system would concede that such
a goal encompasses more than the sole elimination of forceful interac-
tion between states and demands a certain amount of justice and re-
spect for human rights. Explicit references in the Preamble to the
U.N. Charter and the Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations, as well as in article 1(3) of the Char-
ter to the importance of maintaining international peace founded
upon freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human
rights have lent support to the observation that states refuse to allot
an absolute value to the mere avoidance of armed conflict, as such,
and their conviction that certain situations justify and require a de-
parture, at least temporarily, from nonviolent norms in order to
achieve a more equitable world structure.
There is, similarly, no evidence that states have given up the
objectives for which they went to war in the past. As has been noted:
People have gone to war in order to establish or maintain political
independence, to acquire or secure territory, to further or safe-
guard their ideologies and institutions and to acquire or protect
their international position and power. There is not much sign
that political institutions will soon fill the role in respect to these
objectives that war has played until now.
415
War has continued because it appears to those who indulge in it to
fulfill some functions by way of satisfaction of claims which they be-
lieve that they could not achieve without recourse to war. It follows
that "unless there is an alternative to war which could perform an
identical function viz. satisfaction of just claims, it is difficult to see
how war could be abandoned. '41 6
It appears that the pacifist alternative, or Ghandi's maxim that
"if one takes care of the means the end will take care of itself" have
not been acceptable to the community of states. While a certain "re-
vival of interest in pacifism, and in exploration of the techniques of
nonviolent resistance" may be observed in the contemporary genera-
414. W. O'BRIEN, U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION: LAW AND MORALITY 36 (1979).
415. J. HARE & C. JOYNT, ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 56 (1982).
416. A. APPADORAI, THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 34 (1958).
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tion, a realistic conception of "power politics" seems to prevail. 41 7
Among theologians such realism is reflected in the words of Niebuhr:
The pacifists merely assert that if men loved one another all the
complex and sometimes horrible, realities of the political order
could be dispensed with. They do not see that their "if" begs the
most basic problem of human history. It is because men are sin-
ners that justice can be achieved only by a certain degree of coer-
cion on the one hand, and by resistance to coercion and tyranny on
the other hand.
418
At the same time, the alternative envisaged by the founders of the
United Nations, namely, the system of collective security and centrali-
zation of force, has never been implemented, the three assumptions
underlying it failing to materialize. Thus, the Charter's system which
apparently contemplated a Security Council, the organ upon which is
conferred the primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, which would (a) have at its disposal nonmil-
itary and military machineries of compulsion to be used against
recalcitrant states; (b) be endowed with a sufficiently united sense of
purpose in the discharge of its primary responsibility and would be
prepared to use these machineries when faced with threatened or ac-
tual breaches of international peace and security; (c) be objectively
capable of determining when an unlawful breach of the peace has
occurred.
Clearly the United Nations has failed to operate in the envisioned
manner. The deep political cleavage existing among the permanent
members of the Security Council, nourished by the veto system, has
prevented the creation of an international military force placed at the
disposal of the Security Council and has frustrated the projected func-
tioning of the Council. 419 The divisions between the major powers,
deriving from the clash of interests in terms of global strategies, have
also prevented joint decisions relating to the identification 420 and pun-
417. The contemporaneous resolve to abstain from war is often, however, "a practical
rather than a moral creed, resting on the belief that war does not produce its intended results,
rather than on the belief that it is inherently morally wrong." Bull, Recapturing the Just War
for Political Theory, 31 WORLD POL. 588, 589 (1979).
418. Goodman, What is a "Just War" Today?, NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1982, at 53.
419. Internationally controlled and internationally composed military forces have been
created but on an ad hoc basis and subject to agreements of the states concerned rather than to
the compulsory power of the Security Council.
420. Thus, for example, none of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council with re-
gard to the Korean crisis of 1950 included a determination as to who was the aggressor (only
in the General Assembly Resolution 498(V) was the Central People's Government of the PRC
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ishment 421 of aggressors with a view to organizing the universal action
needed to restore the peace. The approach adopted by the Security
Council in this respect has been a pragmatic one. It has focused on
the prevention of the spread of violence or on bringing it to an end,
rather than condemning states.
422
By the same token, the Charter itself, although furnishing the
theoretical framework for a system of collective security, is saddled
with interpretation problems for which the solution is still elusive.
Thus, questions concerning the notions of force, aggression and other
related terms affect the implementation of effective collective action.
Furthermore, as observed by Claude, the Charter does not pro-
vide or promise a system for United Nations action or United Nations
sponsored action to repress the "most dangerous sort of aggression,"
namely that launched or supported by any of the major powers. It is
Claude's contention that
[t]he famous veto clause of Article 27 expresses the founding fa-
thers' rejection of the attempt to require member states to join
forces under the UN banner for resistance to great-power aggres-
sion; "the individual or collective self-defense" clause of Article 51,
a permissive clause, expresses the judgment of the founding fathers
as to what can and must be done under such circumstances.
423
In fact, according to Claude, states have manifested a general
reluctance to confer extensive legal competence and actual coercive
capability upon the United Nations. As he explains:
[E]very state has to contemplate the possibility that it might, under
some circumstances, feel impelled to take military action that
would seem to it absolutely necessary for the protection of vital
national interests but might not be regarded as legitimate by the
political organs of the UN. States do contemplate this possibility;
condemned as an aggressor). Again, in the Suez crisis the Security Council failed to adopt a
resolution identifying the aggressor. Similarly, there has not been any mention in the various
resolutions of the Security Council concerning the Middle East conflict since June 5, 1967 of
the aggressor party, nor was article 39 resorted to in any of the resolutions. No pronounce-
ment has been made by the Security Council as to the aggressors in the Afghanistan invasion
in 1979 or in the 1980 Iraq-Iran war.
421. War criminals have been put on trial only once - after the Second World War -
and this was affected through unique laws, unique procedures and unique agencies without the
subsequent acts that could facilitate their institutionalization and render them permanent.
422. The Security Council approach is taken presumably because of a desire to avoid ag-
gravating the situation by allocating blame for the aggression or by punishing those who origi-
nally threatened or committed the aggression.
423. Claude, United Nations Use of Military Force, in THE UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL
SYSTEM 201, 202-03 (D. Kay ed. 1967).
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consequently, they do not genuinely commit themselves without
reservation to the proposition that they will never resort to force in
the face of international disapproval expressed through the UN;
consequently, they are not ultimately dedicated to the purpose of
enabling the UN - that is, its member states - to control the
unilateral resort to military action by any and all states, including
themselves.
424
In the light of the rejection of the pacifist alternative, on the one hand,
and the failure to establish effective international enforcement ma-
chinery, on the other hand, states, as could realistically have been
expected, have claimed the power to use force in circumstances which
they consider just. A constructive approach would, therefore, focus
on the criteria by means of which the legitimacy of a state's coercive
action could be judged.
424. Id. at 204 (emphasis added in part).

